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## **Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee**

# **Inquiry into the Scottish Government's International Work**



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# Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee

To consider and report on the following (and any additional matter added under Rule 6.1.5A)—

- (a) the Scottish Government's EU and external affairs policy;
- (b) policy in relation to the UK's exit from the EU;
- (c) the international activities of the Scottish Administration, including international development; and
- (d) any other matter falling within the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture and any matter relating to inter-governmental relations within the responsibility of the Deputy First Minister.



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# Introduction

1. This report details the findings of the Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee (the Committee) following our inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work.
2. Since the establishment in 1999 of an office in Brussels, successive Scottish Governments have sought a European presence as well as pursuing a form of wider international engagement.
3. We set out to consider the current approach to that engagement with the EU and beyond, the interaction of the Scottish Government's external affairs policies with those of the UK Government, and how Scotland supports international development.
4. Key themes to emerge from our inquiry were—
  - the importance of adopting a strategic approach
  - the need for a prioritisation of policies to flow from that approach
  - an emphasis on effective collaboration across government to encourage policy coherence in relation both to external affairs and how this interacts with domestic priorities
  - challenges in measuring impact and
  - how we enhance scrutiny
5. Our call for views <sup>1</sup> was issued on 15 September and closed on 29 October 2021. We received 21 written submissions <sup>2</sup> – five from individuals and 16 from organisations – which are available on our website. <sup>3</sup> A summary of the written submissions and evidence gathered can be found in the SPICe briefings *Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work – summary of written evidence* <sup>4</sup> and *Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work – evidence session with the Cabinet Secretary* <sup>5</sup>.
6. The Committee wishes to thank all those organisations and individuals who provided the written and oral evidence that has helped to inform the inquiry and the findings which follow.

# International Strategy

7. There is an assortment of strategies relevant to the Scottish Government's approach to international matters.
8. We cover these in Annexe A, starting with the National Performance Framework (NPF), before moving on to the current iteration of the International Framework, engagement with the EU, the approach to international offices, the planned Cultural Diplomacy Strategy, the proposed International Education Strategy, the Arctic Policy Framework, the Nordic and Baltic Policy Statement, and the commitment to having a Feminist Foreign Policy.
9. The section below covers the evidence we took – and the Committee's views – regarding the purpose and focus of a revised International Framework, as well as what we heard (and our recommendations) on Policy Implementation.

## Updating the International Framework

10. European Merchants<sup>6</sup>, Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE)<sup>7</sup> and the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance<sup>8</sup> all highlight the fact that the Scottish Government's *Scotland's International Framework*<sup>9</sup> was published in 2017 and has not been revised since the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The Committee heard that Framework should be revised with consideration for the current political climate and putting Europe at its heart.
11. The Scottish Government has committed to producing a revised framework, which, the Cabinet Secretary told the Committee, would be published "shortly" and—  
  
"It sets out the Scottish Government's engagement internationally and the values that underpin that engagement, and it demonstrates our wish to be a good global citizen."<sup>10</sup>
12. Whilst most respondents to the Committee's call for views suggested continued engagement with the EU should be a priority, it was recognised that wider external engagement was also necessary.<sup>11</sup>
13. Dr Kirsty Hughes wrote—  
  
 "Scotland's trade, cultural links, soft power reputation and more extend globally, so prioritising some external affairs work beyond the EU is clearly necessary."<sup>12</sup>
14. There was general agreement that the Scottish Government should prioritise its international engagement through both a thematic and geographic focus.<sup>13</sup>
15. RSE stated—  
  
 "Geographically, partnerships with the near abroad, especially intra-regional partnerships with the Nordic/Baltic countries and Ireland, enable Scotland to enhance its influence in the international arena."<sup>14</sup>

16. European Merchants told us—

” “It would be useful for the Scottish Government to articulate a post-Brexit strategy. Of course, we have an international framework, which is about two pages long, and there is a promise of a global affairs framework, which I hope will articulate that kind of vision.”<sup>15</sup>

17. In a document published in 2021, they suggested that a global framework should provide the foundation for all the Scottish Government's frameworks and plans in this policy area, set out guiding principles and objectives, ensure alignment between domestic and external policies, and encourage cross-party engagement.<sup>16</sup>

18. Further detailing the design of such a framework, European Merchants said it should—

- pursue a “Europe First Strategy”
- sequentially prioritise states, regions, subjects and themes for engagement
- draw on specific “engagement vectors” (e.g. the Scots diaspora)
- aim for effective triangulation between Edinburgh, Brussels and other states' capitals
- fully integrate representative offices into its strategy
- propose a new concordat on international relations with the UK Government (the current one and the EU relations concordat became obsolete with Brexit)
- provide the public with more information on European and external relations

19. As with its EU engagement policy, it was felt that the Scottish Government's external affairs policy should adopt a strategic approach; ensuring that priorities in external relations are driven by, and match, domestic priorities. RSE said—

” “One thing that policy experts and academics will always tell you is that there is no clear dividing line between domestic and international policy. That is obvious on issues such as climate change and trade.”<sup>17</sup>

20. Their written submission set this out in more detail, outlining a number of domestic policy objectives – e.g. promoting a wellbeing economy, transition to net zero, promoting gender equality, protecting human rights – informed by international developments. Such objectives could help to shape external affairs policy by promoting partnership working with relevant NGOs and within international networks. To be effective in the realm of international relations called for identifying priority areas where Scotland could offer expertise that might benefit potential partners. It was RSE's view that the 2017 International Framework did not achieve that.<sup>18</sup>

21. Police Scotland expressed support for the Scottish Government's international development programme and principles, including “activities and initiatives which contribute towards community safety and wellbeing, both within Scotland and

beyond our borders".<sup>19</sup>

22. The Scottish Council for Jewish Communities said the success of our international engagement should be judged "not only by the extent to which it enables Scotland to flourish on the international stage" but also its impact at home. With the growing diversity of our population—

” "...the Scottish Government's international work, based on its International Framework, has implications not only for Scotland's relations and engagement abroad, but also for community relations in Scotland." <sup>20</sup>

23. RSE told us what mattered was how the Scottish Government sought to mainstream its international strategy in Cabinet and across all departments; in which respect the European strategy was more defined than the one beyond Europe.<sup>21</sup>

24. In respect of UK foreign and diplomatic policy, there was agreement amongst respondents that the Scottish and UK Governments shared many of the same priorities. It was suggested that with developments to intergovernmental mechanisms, the devolved administrations could play a more significant role in shaping the UK's foreign policies post Brexit.<sup>22</sup>

25. RSE said—

” "...international relations and foreign policy are reserved, but there is wider acceptance that Scotland has an external affairs policy and that Holyrood has this committee." <sup>23</sup>

26. Whilst acknowledging the differences in political outlook between the administrations in Edinburgh and London, RSE considered that UK foreign policy should be informed by "views and interests across the territorial system".<sup>24</sup>

27. European Merchants proposed that the UK and Scottish Governments ought to seek to revisit the concordat on international relations, which dates back to 2013.<sup>25</sup>

28. Dr Hughes suggested that "in many ways, there is clear complementarity between Scottish Government and UK Government policies in external affairs". She added that in principle, both governments want to support and promote key areas notably trade, human rights and climate change.<sup>26</sup>

29. Professor Mills and Dr Birdsall wrote—

” "Scotland's international interests and engagements, while perhaps somewhat divergent, are inextricably linked to Westminster. However, the UK Government does not always use Scotland's unique identity and its existing soft power to its full advantage in the UK's wider foreign policy."

30. It was pointed out by RSE that in 2016, during the last parliamentary session, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government reached a Written Agreement on Intergovernmental Relations<sup>27</sup>, still a relevant document. However—

**”** “We recommend that this agreement, which obliged the Scottish Government to report on ministerial-level engagement with the UK Government, be broadened to include reporting on the Scottish Government’s engagement with the European Union. This would increase transparency and strengthen accountability.” <sup>28</sup>

31. **The Committee shares the view of the majority of witnesses that while a focus on Europe is expected to be a priority for the Scottish Government, wider external engagement – for reasons of trade, culture, education etc. – is also necessary; and should be informed by a strategic approach, one with a clear geographical and thematic rationale. We also believe it is important to ensure alignment between domestic policy and external action, an issue we will return to later in this report.** <sup>29</sup>
32. **Our view is that the revised International Framework should link to and flow from the National Performance Framework, be at the heart of the Scotland Government’s approach to external affairs, and provide a foundation for all other relevant frameworks, strategies and policy documents in that sphere, including—**
- **our engagement with the EU;**
  - **the work of (and plans for any further) international offices;**
  - **the proposed International Education Strategy;**
  - **the Arctic Policy Framework;**
  - **the Nordic and Baltic Policy Statement;**
  - **the 2021 Review of International Development Policy;**
  - **the forthcoming Cultural Diplomacy Strategy; and**
  - **a future Feminist Foreign Policy.**
33. **Additionally – given so much of the emphasis of our international engagement is on trade – we believe there should be read-across with the Scottish Government’s key economic strategies, including—**
- **Towards a Robust, Resilient Wellbeing Economy for Scotland: Report of the Advisory Group on Economic Recovery;**
  - **Scotland's National Strategy for Economic Transformation; and**
  - **Scotland Outlook 2030 - Responsible Tourism for a Sustainable Future.**
34. **We consider such an approach – that all Scotland’s international policy should be linked to the NPF and centred on the revised International Framework – necessary for a clearer understanding of the Scottish Government’s priorities. Otherwise, for the Committee, and anyone else interested in this policy area, it will be difficult to find answers to fundamental questions such as what we are doing, why we are doing it, how well we are**

doing it etc.

35. **The Committee further recommends, in general and top-level terms, that the revised framework—**
- sets out its values and objectives (linked to the domestic agenda);
  - stipulates a long-term timeframe (e.g. for the remainder of the 2020s);
  - prioritises countries, regions and policy themes;
  - provides a clear rationale for that prioritisation;
  - links to relevant aspects of economic, cultural and education policy;
  - integrates international offices into its strategy;
  - explores how to better inform the public and media on the importance of Scotland's European and external relations;
  - takes into account the findings and recommendations of this report; and
  - is published in draft form for consultation.
36. **We also invite the Scottish Government to clarify its position on the status of the 2013 Concordat on International Relations with the UK Government<sup>30</sup> and how it relates to, or indeed whether it has been superseded by, the more recently published Review of Intergovernmental Relations.<sup>31</sup>**

## Policy Implementation

37. We address this part of the report in two parts, focusing first on the European Union and then on Scotland's external relations more widely.

### Relationship with the EU

38. In a speech to the European Policy Centre in 2019, the First Minister suggested it was a "basic truth that Scotland is, always has been, and always will be a European nation". She added—

“...for all its imperfections – and let's face it all governments and all organisations are imperfect – there is an idealism to the EU project which appeals very strongly to us in Scotland.”<sup>32</sup>

### Scottish Government priorities

39. In 2021 the Scottish Government stated in the *Steadfastly European, Scotland's past, present and future* document that—

“The founding values of the EU – human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights – are the Scottish Government's values.”<sup>33</sup>

40. The document committed to continuing with a “positive and proactive role in engaging with the EU institutions and Member States on shared challenges and opportunities”, the sharing of best practice, and taking a collaborative approach to “shape policies and programmes that tackle issues affecting citizens and businesses across Europe”.<sup>34</sup>

### ***Operation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)***

41. The TCA, together with the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, has set the main framework for EU-UK relations since the start of 2021. The UK-EU Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) was set to help monitor implementation of the TCA. The Committee and our counterparts in Wales and Northern Ireland have been corresponding with the UK Parliament about the PPA.<sup>35</sup>
42. As the Committee noted in our report on the UK internal market, the House of Lords has stated that it “is anticipated that observers from the devolved legislatures will also be invited to attend, subject to the agreement of the European Parliament.” We also noted that it is anticipated that the devolved legislatures will have a role in relation to meetings of the UK delegation prior to the PPA.<sup>36</sup>
43. Several written responses noted that a number of the policy areas covered by the TCA and the Withdrawal Agreement were devolved; and so there should be a role for the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament in engaging with the TCA. RSE stated—
- ” It is imperative that the Scottish Government maximise all available intergovernmental channels to ensure devolved interests are represented in their governance and implementation.”<sup>37</sup>
44. The Law Society of Scotland made a similar point, arguing for a “cross-UK approach” to the TCA, covering not only the UK Government but all the administrations.<sup>38</sup>
45. The European Policy Centre told us—
- ” the relationship between Scotland and the EU will not exclusively go through the Trade and Co-operation Agreement, but the overall relationship of the UK with the EU will have a significant, if not decisive, impact on the relationship that Scotland can have with the EU.”<sup>39</sup>
46. Similarly, the Law Society of Scotland said that EU engagement must be done in a co-ordinated way, a “whole-UK approach”, that “cut both ways”—
- ” The UK must take into account the devolution settlement, and the devolved Governments must take into account wider UK Government policy.”<sup>40</sup>

### ***Challenges of being a third country***

47. Various witnesses told us that it will be difficult for the Scottish Government to

engage with the EU on policy matters as a part of a third country<sup>41</sup>. While the EU have indicated that that they welcome dialogue with Scottish stakeholders, the European Policy Centre highlighted that—

” “consideration has to be given to what is in it for the member states and the institutions with which Scotland wants to engage”.<sup>42</sup>

48. European Merchants described “three principal challenges”: reduced access to EU institutions (now being dependent on the “minimal EU-UK relationship”); reduced relevance to Brussels (being no longer part of either the EU or the EEA); and association with the UK Government’s approach (being part of the UK)—

” “...you need to have a well-developed strategy that outlines a post-Brexit vision for what the Scottish Government aims to achieve from engagement with the EU and how it intends to go about doing that, considering the new challenges that need to be faced.”<sup>43</sup>

49. The European Policy Centre<sup>44</sup>, the Law Society of Scotland<sup>45</sup> and RSE<sup>46</sup> all stated that the most successful examples of parts of third countries engaging with the EU have been those that have had a specific focus. Those with a focus, building expertise and developing best practice can, despite being a relatively small actor, make a significant contribution.

50. The Law Society of Scotland suggested that the Scottish Government may wish to look at the models followed by Switzerland, Norway and Bavaria to learn from their best practices.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Informal co-operation***

51. Various witnesses including David McAllister MEP<sup>48</sup>, the European Policy Centre<sup>49</sup> and RSE<sup>50</sup> highlighted the distinction between formal and informal engagement with the EU. While many witnesses mentioned Scotland’s good relations with the EU, they stressed that formal discussions will all be done through the UK Government.

52. David McAllister MEP stated that the European Parliament was obliged to respect the “constitutional order of the third country” and therefore—

” “Formal co-operation is not possible, but there are many possibilities for informal cooperation.”<sup>51</sup>

53. He went on to recommend that the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament use informal channels instead, such as the European Friends of Scotland, an informal cross-party network of MEPs.<sup>52</sup>

54. Glasgow Life highlighted that informal relationships can contribute to knowledge exchanges and developing new partnerships.<sup>53</sup>

55. Similarly, Glasgow Caledonian University wrote that the Scottish Government should continue its engagement with the EU and seek to find ways to ensure that

Scottish organisations and citizens can continue to benefit from EU programmes as much as possible.<sup>54</sup>

56. The Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance said—

” “...there are areas in education, climate, wellbeing and the cultural and digital economy in which the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government can engage directly with the EU”.<sup>55</sup>

### ***Keeping Pace with EU law***

57. It was the view of European Merchants that—

” “Given that the Scottish Government aims to increase its European and international engagement, it would be logical for the Scottish Parliament to intensify its scrutiny of the Government in this field.”<sup>56</sup>

58. Many witnesses, such as the Law Society of Scotland<sup>57</sup> and the Royal Society of Edinburgh<sup>58</sup> highlighted the importance of the decisions made by the Scottish Government to align with a specific EU law (or not) and the importance for Scottish Parliament committees to gain full access to these decisions.

59. The Law Society of Scotland also pointed out the enormity of the task of scrutinising which EU laws are chosen. They gave the example that in 2020 more than 1,300 legal acts were adopted across the EU, although noting that many of those were not relevant to Scotland.<sup>59</sup>

60. RSE pointed out that there may be a short cut available to sift through the legal acts by looking at the list of EU laws required to be transposed into laws in Northern Ireland, as a result of the Northern Ireland protocol. However, they stressed that—

” “the Scottish Parliament needs to be clear about how the Scottish Government is sifting it, what the priority areas are, and what the overall balance looks like.”<sup>60</sup>

61. They emphasised the importance of this being done in a transparent way so that the Parliament can carry out scrutiny and ascertain whether there are—

” “benefits from being exactly aligned, in order to minimise some of the Brexit regulatory barriers, or is it just a general good intention?”<sup>61</sup>

62. In November 2021, the Committee reported on the *UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Act 2021: Draft Policy Statement and Draft Annual Report* in a letter to the Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture.<sup>62</sup>

63. We highlighted that there was an urgent need for Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government officials to work together to develop proposals to facilitate effective scrutiny of the commitment to align with EU law.

64. This was something also raised by various witnesses during this inquiry, including

RSE<sup>63</sup>, the European Movement in Scotland<sup>64</sup>, and the Law Society of Scotland<sup>65</sup>. The latter sought “more formal mechanisms” for parliamentary oversight and stated—

” “One potential option would be a memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government covering this.”<sup>66</sup>

65. RSE suggested the Committee focus on the Scottish Government’s “broad intentions” and “areas of strategic priority” in the context of the EU’s strategic agenda.<sup>67</sup>
66. **The Committee’s view is that it is essential that both the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament continue to have a strong relationship with the EU. We recommend that the Scottish Government publishes a clear strategy and priorities in relation to its engagement with the EU. This should include its priorities in relation to—**
- **Alignment with EU law;**
  - **The operation of the TCA;**
  - **Engagement of Scottish institutions in EU programmes;**
  - **A UK-wide approach; and**
  - **Soft power and informal engagement.**
67. **The Committee notes that the Scottish Government has yet to respond to our report published on 25 November 2021 on the draft policy statement and draft annual report on the use of the keeping pace powers within the UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Act 2021.**<sup>68</sup> **Given the emphasis within that report on the need for increased transparency and Ministerial accountability this is disappointing.**

### ***Role of the International Offices***

68. RSE<sup>69</sup> and the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance<sup>70</sup> highlighted that the Brussels Office plays a key role in keeping up to date on EU legislation. European Merchants said—

” “On trade relations with the EU and the Scottish Parliament’s scrutiny...That office is a core part of the Scottish Government’s monitoring of and engagement with what is happening in Brussels.”<sup>71</sup>

69. The Scottish Government stated that the Brussels office provided “strategic insight and advice” on the direction and priorities of EU policy across various directorates within government—

” “The EU Office also gathers information and facilitates discussions with EU institutions, where this can help colleagues, for example in understanding the detail behind a policy, or even providing evidence from Scotland where this can be of benefit.”<sup>72</sup>

70. According to the EU director of the Scottish Government's Brussels office—

” “At the end of each reporting year, each office produces an evaluation report that is fed back centrally to colleagues, the director for external affairs and the international board that sits above all that.”<sup>73</sup>

71. Such reports are intended to allow the board to monitor the offices' effectiveness; to ensure they are achieving their objectives; and that they provide value for money. However, these reports have only ever been published under Freedom of Information requests.

72. **The Committee recommends that the Scottish Government undertake to publish an Annual Report setting out the contribution made by the international offices to promoting the values, objectives and priorities of the revised International Framework.**

### ***Erasmus and Turing***

73. According to the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance, Scotland was the largest recipient of Erasmus students in 2019 and many witnesses expressed disappointment at the loss of the Erasmus+ programme.<sup>74</sup>

74. RSE were also unhappy with the UK Government's decision not to continue with participation in Erasmus—

” “When we look at the decision to stay associated with the horizon research programme but not with the Erasmus programme, it looks rather ideological, and it clearly restricts opportunities for young people.”<sup>75</sup>

75. While witnesses such as the European Movement in Scotland<sup>76</sup> wrote in support of Scotland re-joining the Erasmus+ programme, David McAllister MEP said—

” “Unfortunately, we were not able to find a solution to Scottish participation in the Erasmus+ programme, simply because we cannot allow parts of third countries to join the programme.”<sup>77</sup>

76. Several witnesses including Glasgow Caledonian University<sup>78</sup>, the Law Society<sup>79</sup>, Universities Scotland<sup>80</sup> and the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance<sup>81</sup> highlighted that the Turing Scheme, aimed at replacing the Erasmus+ programme, is not a bilateral programme. As a result Scotland will miss out on dialogues with European civic institutions, research institutions and universities which can develop relationships and even lead to job opportunities for those involved. Universities Scotland went on to say that universities now have to form their own new bilateral agreements with previous Erasmus partners.<sup>82</sup>

77. However, the Law Society of Scotland<sup>83</sup> highlighted that it is too early to comment on the impact of the Turing Scheme. They said that it was important for the Scottish Government to continue to support students from abroad through schemes such as Scotland's Saltire Scholarships, which provides scholarships to citizens of Canada, China, India, Japan, Pakistan and USA to study in Scotland<sup>84</sup>.
78. Similarly, Universities Scotland highlighted that the Turing Scheme provides opportunities for shorter term exchanges, which can benefit students who cannot commit to a full semester.<sup>85</sup>
79. In comparison, the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance highlighted that significant investment is being made by the Welsh Government to replicate the Erasmus scheme with European partners.<sup>86</sup>
80. **The Committee invites the Scottish Government to reflect on the evidence given to us concerning the Erasmus+ programme, the Turing Scheme and Scotland's Saltire Scholarships; to consider what other options may be available to seek to replicate the benefits of the Erasmus+ programme; and to outline what work is being undertaken to support academic links and develop opportunities for students and young people.**

### ***Funding***

81. As with the current year, the International and European Relations budget line for 2022-23 is allocated all but £100,000 of the External Affairs budget. There are 17 budget lines in the proposed International and European Relations budget. These include a new budget line for the Scottish Government's office in Copenhagen.
82. For the first time the budgets for the Scottish Government hub offices in London, Dublin and Berlin are included within the External Affairs budget having previously been included in the Economy, Fair Work and Culture budget.
83. Details of the International and European Relations budget for 2022-23 are provided below.

## International and European Relations budget 2022-23

Level 4 Budget Line	2021-22 Budget (£m)	2022-23 Budget (£m)
External Affairs Advice and Policy	7.1	7.1
International Development	10	11.5
International Development administration	0.17	0.17
Scottish Government office - Canada	0.58	0.64
Scottish Government office - China	0.56	0.63
Scottish Government office - United States of America	0.82	0.79
Scottish Government office - Paris	0.57	0.66
Scottish Government office - Brussels	2.35	2.47
International Relations	0.24	0.68
Humanitarian Aid	1	1
Scottish Connections - to support a range of activity aimed at enhancing Scotland's global reputation through continuing commitment to the Brand Scotland collaboration	1.56	1.35
European Strategy	0.49	0.25
Migration Strategy	2.19	2.26
Scottish Government office - Copenhagen	n/a	0.6
Scottish Government office – London	2.08	2.18
Scottish Government office – Dublin	0.57	0.59
Scottish Government office - Berlin	0.53	0.57

84. RSE suggested that the external affairs budget in 2021-22, totalling 0.05% of the overall Scottish budget, represented good value in respect of export growth, international profile, international development outcomes, and the positive relationships with the EU and others.<sup>87</sup>
85. In the context of Brexit, Dr Hughes wrote that the Scottish Government's external affairs impacts and effectiveness "look considerable". She highlighted the Scottish Government's ability to maintain good relations and a positive image for Scotland with EU partners though she added "how this is valued compared to budget is an open question, but it is clearly of value".<sup>88</sup>
86. According to the European Movement in Scotland, figures for the cost of the Scottish Government's international offices suggested "good value for money". However, they believed that Brexit called for more investment "to achieve anything like the access and influence" that Scotland had enjoyed when the UK was part of the EU. Such investment was, they wrote, "vital".<sup>89</sup>

## Wider International Relations

87. Similar to views on the approach to EU engagement, most written submissions to the Committee's inquiry suggested that the Scottish Government's approach to wider international relations should be based on a strategic approach. There was also a sense that such an approach should include ensuring that priorities in external relations are consistent with domestic priorities. In addition, most respondents who addressed the question suggested that the Scottish Government should use culture and soft power to promote Scotland internationally.<sup>90</sup>

## **Scottish Government priorities**

88. According to the Scottish Government's webpage outlining its overall approach—
- ” “We are working with countries and institutions across the world to strengthen our international relationships, increase our trade and investment, and ultimately achieve our overarching objective of sustainable economic growth in Scotland.”<sup>91</sup>
89. The Cabinet Secretary told the Committee that Scotland had a role in “demonstrating high international standards” and the Scottish Government would pursue an “internationalisation agenda to influence the world around us on the issues that matter the most”.<sup>92</sup>

## **Culture and soft power**

90. The British Council emphasised the need, given the use of public spend, to measure the economic return on investment in soft power. One of the methods was “a perceptions survey” involving thousands of people across the G20 and which looked at their engagement with, understanding of and attraction to the UK. They said they would “soon” have the Scottish measure of this and be pleased to share the results with the committee.<sup>93</sup>
91. They suggested cultural collaboration was crucial to “investing in long term relationships to secure mutually beneficial outcomes” as the culture and education sectors aimed to move beyond the pandemic. The example of collaborative work cited was undertaken with Creative Scotland and Universities Scotland and aimed at promoting Scotland's soft power. The research, it was suggested, showed the difference such an approach can make to “trade, inward investment, tourism, international study and diplomatic influence”—
- ” “Soft Power Today (October 2017), a report published by the British Council and the University of Edinburgh, found that countries which invest in overseas cultural institutes see significant returns. For example, a 1% increase in the number of locations a cultural institution covers results in a near 0.66% increase in Foreign Direct Investment for the parent country. In 2016, such a rise would have been worth £1.3bn for the UK.”<sup>94</sup>
92. The British Council described soft power as “a very competitive space”, with various nations competing to influence the choices of people and policy makers. China's spend for example was estimated to be in the region of \$10 billion a year, with the EU and the US also very active in the space.<sup>95</sup>
93. Furthermore, the British Council said—
- ” “We are in the optimism business...and it is really important that we help people to realise their ambitions and aspirations”.<sup>96</sup>
94. Glasgow Life's submission highlighted the role of culture, sport and major events as key drivers of soft power and the Scottish brand. They encouraged the Scottish Government to develop “an explicit soft power strategy integrated with other

economic, environmental and social strategies underpinned by the National Performance Framework". More clarity and planning, it suggested, could deliver on better outcomes.<sup>97</sup>

95. In evidence to our inquiry on the Resource Spending Review, RSE also emphasised the value of the creative industries and their "growing contribution to Scotland's economic and social capital" in terms of high quality jobs, skills and training—
- ” “And they play an important role in Scotland's international offering as part of 'Brand Scotland'.”<sup>98</sup>
96. The Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance suggested the Scottish Government's policies should focus on "promoting the distinctive culture, produce, tourism, education and research qualities of the Scottish brand". They defined the word brand as the reputation of Scotland and the Scottish Government in such realms as climate policy, digital economy and human rights legislation. Their concern, despite the strength of that brand internationally, was that it was outdated—
- ” "...the brand is very nostalgic—the perception of Scotland is a couple of hundred years old. There is relatively poor recognition, both in the Anhalt-Ipsos nation brands index and British Council data, of Scotland's cutting-edge position in science, as one of the most cited countries in the world, per capita.”<sup>99</sup>
97. Citing the Scottish space strategy, launched at the World Expo in Dubai, as an example of updating that brand for industry, academia and more widely, they spoke of "soft power" and modernising the image we present while not losing the inherent vitality of its appeal.<sup>100</sup>
98. **The Committee recommends that the Scottish Government's forthcoming Cultural Diplomacy Strategy provides a clear rationale – including priorities and objectives – for its approach to soft power; links to and flows from the revised International Framework; and sets out how it will interact with the UK Government's strategy as detailed in the *Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* document.**<sup>101</sup>

### ***Principles and priorities***

99. In a joint submission, Professor Kurt Mills and Dr Andrea Birdsall set out that human rights should be embedded in all aspects of the Scottish Government's international engagement. Their submission supported the Scottish Government's commitment to develop a feminist foreign policy and the need to continue to highlight and strengthen initiatives around climate justice, business and human rights and peacebuilding.<sup>102</sup>
100. They also identified current and future tensions between "ambitions and commitment", particularly with relationships with those "whose commitments to human rights and democracy may be less than firm". Rwanda was seen as a

“positive and innovative” example, providing aid direct to organisations rather than via the regime and therefore supporting the “most vulnerable”—

” “Yet, maintaining a delicate balance between the human rights aspirations of the Government and realities of global diplomacy will always be a challenge.”  
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101. There would be other instances, they felt, where “such finesse” would not be enough to manage relations with governments with a record of human rights abuse. They suggested this was “particularly” the case with China, with whom Scotland “obviously wants to have good relations” in terms of trade and culture.<sup>104</sup>

102. RSE sought to draw a distinction between principles and priorities—

” “It is not that human rights, or multilateralism, should just be one of your 10 priorities. That should surely be the framework within which your priorities are climate change, trade, international development, youth, education and other issues.”<sup>105</sup>

103. **The Committee’s view is that issues prioritised in external relations should be driven by, match and inform domestic priorities; be that working towards a wellbeing economy, sustainable development, promoting gender equality, or protecting human rights etc.**

104. **It matters that any tensions between the Scottish Government’s ambitions and its commitments are considered carefully in policy terms and – whether those links happen to be focused on trade, education, cultural exchange, or international development – subject to public and parliamentary scrutiny.**

105. **This will be important for mainstreaming the international agenda across the Scottish Government and ensuring policy coherence. For these reasons, we recommend that the forthcoming and revised International Framework recognises the need for a harmonisation of policy between the domestic and the outward facing.**<sup>106</sup>

### ***Role of International Offices***

106. In terms of international presence, RSE stated that the advantage of having offices in different nations was that they can have individual strategies.<sup>107</sup> This was supported by the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance who highlighted that, for example, the climate strategies linked to Nordic and Arctic policy make particular sense for the new international office in Copenhagen.<sup>108</sup>

107. The British Council said they would welcome more international offices around the world to spread Scotland’s presence.<sup>109</sup>

108. In contrast, the Scotland Malawi Partnership<sup>110</sup>, Glasgow Caledonian University<sup>111</sup> and Scotland’s International Development Alliance<sup>112</sup> all agreed that the Scottish Government does not necessarily need to invest in new international offices around the world to gain a footprint in more countries. They highlighted that

it should instead work via civic society organisations, universities and networks already in place.

109. With particular regard to international offices and the impact of their work, the Scottish Arts and Humanities Alliance said—
- ” “...we need some measures—key performance indicators, if you like—of hub activity that has led to successful outcomes in driving forward trade relationships, positive research funding and so on.” <sup>113</sup>
110. This was echoed by RSE <sup>114</sup> and the Law Society of Scotland <sup>115</sup>, who said that a clear strategy would assist both accountability and transparency.
111. European Merchants suggested four criteria for evaluating the objectives of the international office network—
- the work and performance of each office
  - relationships and connectivity between the offices (collectively and individually) and Edinburgh
  - policy strategy and direction in Edinburgh
  - learning and future development, including expansion of the network <sup>116</sup>
112. They went on to say that there should be justification for new offices addressing why locations were chosen and how the offices would tie in with the strategic objectives. <sup>117</sup>
113. **The Committee recommends that the Scottish Government provides a detailed justification for any new international offices, including why those locations were chosen and also how they fit with the international offices' own strategic objectives, and in turn the revised International Framework, the National Performance Framework, and Scotland's National Strategy for Economic Transformation.**

### ***Scots and aspirational Scots***

114. A Scottish Government paper on the diaspora in 2009 put the number of people across the world claiming some sort of Scots ancestry at between 28 million and 40 million people. <sup>118</sup> In the United States of America, the 2020 census indicated that just under five million Americans identify themselves as of Scottish descent, with four million more as Scots-Irish. <sup>119</sup>
115. In terms of utilising the potential of the Scots diaspora, the Cabinet Secretary described the “challenge – or opportunity” of how to discover, maintain and develop that relationship. The prevailing view had been this was mostly about those who had emigrated to North America or Australia and New Zealand, but he said tens of thousands of students had come here to study before returning to the country from which they had come—

” “They are a form of Scottish diaspora as well – they are aspirational Scots. We need to find imaginative ways of striking a continuing relationship with those people and making the most out of that.” <sup>120</sup>

116. He suggested Ireland had “a great experience” in terms of the relationship with its diaspora and indicated “more to come on that issue”. <sup>121</sup>
117. **The Committee recognises the potential of the Global Scots network <sup>i</sup> in terms of the promotion of international trade and acknowledge the role of Scottish Development International on that front. We heard about the work undertaken by the British Council in promoting all the nations of the UK through culture and education. It is also clear, with students who come to Scotland to pursue their studies before returning to their home countries, that higher education has a role to play.**
118. **We would therefore welcome more detail on how the Scottish Government intends to maximise its engagement with the Scots diaspora and (as described by the Cabinet Secretary) aspirational Scots; and inclusion of that approach in the revised international Framework.**

### ***Funding***

119. The 2021-22 Budget allocated £30.6 million for the External Affairs budget line. The draft budget for 2022-23 is £33.4 million. According to the Scottish Government's budget document—

” “...we will continue our commitment to internationalisation by building on relationships, celebrating cultural, educational and ancestral connections, and exchanging policy ideas to address shared challenges, ensuring Scotland remains a valued and well-connected nation.”

120. RSE wrote that at 0.05% of the Scottish Government's overall budget—

” “This small proportion is commensurate to the level of constitutional responsibility the government has in this policy sphere, but this active portfolio also reflects the increasing co-dependence of domestic and international issues.” <sup>122</sup>

121. They pointed to a growth in exports, Scotland's profile internationally, the impact of “targeted investments” in the field of international development, and the positive relationship that Scotland continues to have with Europe. However, it was felt there was a need to “build capacity”. <sup>123</sup>

### ***Transparency and Accountability***

122. Various witnesses, including European Merchants, <sup>124</sup> the Scottish Arts and
- 

<sup>i</sup> See section on International Offices in the Annexe

Humanities Alliance,<sup>125</sup> Law Society of Scotland<sup>126</sup> and RSE<sup>127</sup> highlighted the importance of the Parliament enhancing its scrutiny of the Scottish Government's international engagement in terms of priorities, focus and objectives.

123. The Law Society of Scotland underlined the importance of transparency, arguing that a clearer and more detailed strategy would be “easier to judge” in terms of outcomes and delivery.<sup>128</sup> Similarly, RSE said that regular detailed reporting would provide transparency and enable proper scrutiny.<sup>129</sup>
124. For European Merchants, the global arena could be “calculated and thankless” and “international relations should be a serious policy field, not a superficial function of the independence debate”.<sup>130</sup> They encouraged the Parliament to ensure the balance of activity was weighted toward Europe and not expanding into new geographical territories “without a strategic basis”. The suggestion was for a greater focus on strategy, analysis and scrutiny and less on “manifest, but often undefined, ambitions”—
- ” “The collective objective for Scottish society should be to reimagine our debate on Scotland’s global standpoint.”<sup>131</sup>
125. The British Council highlighted that—
- ” “We have been able to demonstrate that the return on investment in soft power can generate economic benefits as well as reputational benefits and influence.”<sup>132</sup>
126. Furthermore, while speaking to the Committee they said that it is important to remember that some aspects of their work, such as reputation, are difficult to assess. However, they are attempting to measure it using proxies and outreach – for example, by measuring the number of events that they promote and how their social media footprint grows.<sup>133</sup>
127. The Head of the Scottish Government’s London office<sup>134</sup> added that they use survey tools as well as quantitative elements, such as number of people brought into the office, to measure the impression made on key target stakeholders and develop future aims and objectives.
128. The EU Director of the Scottish Government’s Brussels office also pointed out that diplomacy is not an easy thing to assess, and generally not about the short-term—
- ” “Things like reputation and enhancement of reputation...are hard to measure, although we try to measure them. It is an evolving situation.”<sup>135</sup>
129. Glasgow Caledonian University, however, suggested that universities were increasingly able to show impact, with “pracdemics”<sup>136</sup> helping to “facilitate improvements as well as measurements.”<sup>137</sup>
130. The proposed Scottish Council on Global Affairs (SGCA)<sup>138</sup> was welcomed by RSE as a means to enable interdisciplinary research, provide a forum for public engagement, pool expertise across academic networks and beyond, build awareness of international issues relevant to Scotland, and equip the next

generation of globally aware policy makers.<sup>139</sup>

131. **The Committee notes comments from a number of witnesses that more of an emphasis on international relations by the Scottish Government calls for more scrutiny by the Scottish Parliament. We will continue to carry out that scrutiny role in respect of our remit, noting also the Scottish Government's commitment to inform us of developments, and further encouraging the inclusion of measurable outcomes in its strategic aims and policy objectives.**
132. **We recognise the challenges in measuring the impact of diplomacy and soft power. Much of the work of pursuing foreign policy objectives may be difficult to quantify as direct and immediate benefits. That said, we heard from several witnesses about the enhanced possibilities offered by "pracademics", the use of perceptions surveys, and the potential of the proposed Scottish Council on Global Affairs.**
133. **The Committee would encourage the Scottish Government to continue to explore how best it can assess the impact and influence of its external affairs work. We have already recommended publication of an Annual Report to set out the contribution made by the international offices (see paragraph 72). We also note in this context the British Council's forthcoming publication of the Scottish measure of what attracts people to the UK, whether in business, cultural or other contexts.**

# International Development

134. Issues of particular interest to the Committee in this area included: an encouragement for more policy coherence; the Scottish Government's approach to international development policy in light of increased funding; arguments for geographical and thematic approaches; and the central role of the Parliament in providing scrutiny.

## Policy coherence

135. Scotland's International Development Alliance underlined the need for policy coherence across economic, social and climate issues. They cited the thinking of the OECD and the UN, whose sustainable development goals set out a policy coherence target, and the need for those who provided scrutiny to recognise coherence or at least be able to identify "incoherence and trade-offs".<sup>140</sup>
136. They were encouraged that the Scottish Government had recently established a ministerial working group, the purpose of which was to encourage policy coherence.<sup>141</sup> However, they also alluded to a company in Fife<sup>142</sup> in receipt of government subsidy and which in their view raised questions over "negative international impact"—
- ” “The reality is that choosing domestic jobs over international impact is part of an uncomfortable conversation that processes around policy coherence would force us into.”<sup>143</sup>
137. Policy coherence was not a focus on "finding the perfect solution" but about seeking greater efficiency and doing so by making the most of sustainable development impact assessment tools – "for example, the tool that was developed by the Scottish Parliament information centre in the previous session of Parliament" – to ensure "value for money is achieved across any area of policy when it comes to international impact".<sup>144</sup>
138. They also referenced "Outcomes-focused Policy Making in Scotland", a document and toolkit created in partnership between the Scottish Government and an EU-funded project. However, this was "not widely used" and it was suggested that officials should be encouraged to "use that lens to make progress" with policy coherence.<sup>145</sup>
139. Ultimately, this was about Scotland taking a global view—
- ” “I do not think that we can make genuine progress without an increasing awareness among the general public of how their actions impact the social, environmental and economic outcomes of people elsewhere.”<sup>146</sup>
140. Firefly International, a small Scottish NGO, suggested international development must be a "clear priority" and one "with considerably more prominence in the public domain than currently".<sup>147</sup>
141. The Scotland Malawi Partnership also encouraged an approach informed by policy

coherence. They cited examples of “cross-cutting links” and “civic support and buy in” from the relationship between Scotland and Malawi, initiatives that had arisen from the ground up, particularly in the areas of health and policing—

” “...our mission is to bring together the myriad different links that have grown organically to ensure that they can offer maximum strategic impact by ensuring that they build on the learning of others and make a meaningful contribution to the plans and priorities of the Government of Malawi.” <sup>148</sup>

142. **The Committee notes the importance placed on policy coherence by the OECD and UN, the latter’s sustainable development goals including a policy coherence target. In the interests of rigorous decision making and accountability, we must be provided with sufficient information to determine where there is policy coherence, where it is lacking, or where the case can be made for trade-offs or compromise.**
143. **Policy coherence will also require a better understanding and profile of international development issues across the Scottish Government and its agencies. We recognise that there are assessment tools of which the Scottish Government can make more use in formulating policy, and likewise for the Scottish Parliament to inform our scrutiny work.**
144. **We also recognise that public interest and understanding will be a key component in appreciation of how our actions and behaviour in Scotland can impact on people elsewhere. The Committee would therefore welcome the Scottish Government’s consideration of how it can raise public awareness not only of its international policy overall – as we have already recommended <sup>149</sup> – but also an understanding of specific issues such as sustainability, climate justice, human rights etc.**
145. **Given the commitment in the Programme for Government 2021-22 to reconstitute a Ministerial working group on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development, we also invite the Scottish Government to detail all that it is doing to ensure international development issues can help to shape development of its domestic policy agenda.**
146. **As previously stated, it is the Committee’s view that issues prioritised in external relations - be that working towards a wellbeing economy, sustainable development, promoting gender equality, or protecting human rights etc - should be driven by, match and inform domestic priorities.** <sup>150</sup>

## Scale and focus

147. RSE told us Scotland was “a relatively small actor” when compared with the UK and EU, but what mattered was maintaining a focus and developing a “particular expertise”. <sup>151</sup>
148. The Scotland Malawi Partnership’s said that even with the increase in the scale of funding – up to £15 million during this session of Parliament – Scotland’s spend on international development was comparable with that of Jersey. Humility, self-

awareness and “better conversations” were the key to making an impact—

” “We cannot kid on that that is a world-changing quantity of money, however good it is, and so my encouragement is to focus on the distinctive approach that values civic mobilisation in countries, that has dignified partnership at its heart and that is able to support good governance...based on a reciprocal approach.”<sup>152</sup>

149. Firefly International suggested also that Scotland should seek to establish partnerships with other members of the international development community, especially smaller EU member states such as Ireland, as well as non-EU members such as Norway. Such “strategic partnerships” could bring about “active funding partnerships” with some of those donor countries aligned with our priorities.<sup>153</sup>
150. Outlining the 2021 [review](#) of international development policy<sup>154</sup>, the Cabinet Secretary highlighted four changes—
- restructuring of funding schemes
  - establishing a panel of experts to ensure that global south voices are properly heard at ministerial level
  - updating criteria to deliver the impact desired in partner countries
  - ensuring international development focuses on “the asks” from partner countries<sup>155</sup>
151. **The Committee acknowledges the importance of international development within the realm of the Scottish Government's international strategy. We recognise that the budget at its disposal, welcome though the increase in funding is, remains relatively modest and – as one witness observed – is not a world-changing amount. Also, that focusing on what expertise Scotland can offer will be important if we are to have an impact. We also recall the evidence from our consideration of the Climate Justice Fund in 2021 that a small amount of funding, when directed at the right project, can make a significant difference to communities impacted by climate change and poverty.<sup>156</sup> The Committee invites the Scottish Government to provide an update on the restructuring of funding schemes as set out in its 2021 review.**

## A distinctive approach

152. Several responses to the call for views were received from organisations working in the international development sector. They were clear that international development should be a priority for the Scottish Government's external affairs policy. For example, Firefly International suggested the area deserved “considerably more prominence in the public domain” and wanted to see the Scottish Government's work distinguished from that of the UK Government.<sup>157</sup>
153. The Scotland Malawi Partnership encouraged a big picture perspective and to ask ourselves why we did international development work. They said that Scotland's

approach was “something quite distinctive” and an example of “progressive internationalism”, exemplified in our relationship with Malawi. Recalling when Lord McConnell visited Malawi 17 years ago, they said he had been “struck by the scale of civic links” between the two countries—

” “He was amazed that you could go across Malawi and reliably meet people who would be banging on about Scotland and their church links, their school links, their university link and the links that they had through the charities that they were involved in.” <sup>158</sup>

154. The work with Malawi was unlike the “dominant international development industry paradigm of the day”; an approach premised on a lop-sided power dynamic between global north and global south and the view “that what works in Madagascar can be unproblematically transplanted to work in Malawi”. Rather, there was “a recognition of the value that all of civic society can have”. It was not so much a relationship based on “big numbers or corporate entities” as one of “friendship, human understanding and dignified partnership”. <sup>159</sup>

155. They described a “synergy” between governments, parliaments and civic society, with “1,200 different examples, disaggregated by every Holyrood constituency”, all MSPs having civic links with Malawi in their constituency, and—

” “For every pound that the Scottish Government puts into the Scotland Malawi Partnership, more than £200 comes from Scottish civic society.” <sup>160</sup>

156. The Scottish Emergency Medicine-Malawi Project also expressed support for the Scottish Government's international Development policy when it was delivered in conjunction with civic society. <sup>161</sup>

157. **The Committee notes the approach developed in Scotland's engagement with Malawi over the last two decades. The evidence we heard suggests that the Scotland-Malawi relationship is one based more on common understanding and local partnership than a top-down we-know-best approach.**

## Thematic expertise and geography

158. Respondents suggested international development policy should be based around developing thematic expertise in areas such as climate change, gender and migration, including supporting refugees.

159. There was no clear consensus on whether the geographic focus of the international development policy should be focussed on a small number of countries or more widely. Some responses highlighted concerns that the policy should not over extend itself and there was a call from the Scotland Malawi Partnership for a continued focus on Malawi. <sup>162</sup>

160. The University of Strathclyde highlighted its engagement with Malawi over 25 years, and now other universities in Scotland were also involved in infrastructure and education. The work that Scottish Water and Police Scotland have undertaken with Malawi was highlighted by the Scotland Malawi Partnership. <sup>163</sup>

161. There may be a view that prioritising one region or country over another was not an ideal approach. However, as Glasgow Caledonian University contended, the alternative would weaken the development of “a depth of relationship”. They believed the solution lay in making more of civic society, including universities, “to gain a footprint”, pointing to their own institution’s “extensive networks” in South America with other universities and more widely.<sup>164</sup>
162. The Scottish Government said there was a geographical focus on the three sub-Saharan countries with which we were currently in partnership, spending there likely to rise to £25-26 million during this parliamentary session. However, they also described it as “right and proper” to “professionalise thematically” and draw on those areas in which Scotland had proven skills – e.g. climate justice and also health, with an NHS global citizenship programme involving “extensive partnerships” with both Malawi and now Zambia—
- ” “I think that we should remain focused on that geographic area, but we should also accelerate and increase the level of global leadership that we can provide, at a policy level, on individual themes.”<sup>165</sup>
163. Scotland’s International Development Alliance said Scotland had been “a beacon on loss and damage” at COP26 and cited several other areas where there was potential, despite limited funds, to be a world leader – including food security, educational outcomes for women girls in the global south, and cancellation of debt. They spoke of a need “to change narratives and support new ways of thinking” and said—
- ” “It takes leadership from significant small sub-state actors, such as Scotland, to change that narrative.”<sup>166</sup>
164. Their written submission also suggested that Scotland’s external affairs work and overseas presence should prioritise a leadership role on sustainable development; a role that could include—
- measuring and reporting on Scotland’s global environmental and human impact footprint holistically
  - adopting a headline measure of progress beyond GDP growth that represents the broader concerns of human and ecological wellbeing
  - using public procurement, public policy and leadership on business practice in Scotland to support sustainable development
  - supporting calls for cancellation of all external debt payments due to be made in the next two years for those countries in need, and most urgently, for 77 of the world’s lowest-income countries as identified by the World Bank, and
  - championing loss and damage in climate finance, while boosting the quantity of grant-based support in climate finance and ensuring more of it is focused on the least developed and most vulnerable countries<sup>167</sup>
165. **The Committee reiterates our earlier recommendation that the revised International Framework should set out clear connections and be integrated with all relevant strands of Scottish Government policy, including the 2021**

## **Review of International Development Policy and the National Performance Framework.** <sup>168</sup>

166. **Our view is that the revised International Framework should provide the basis for Scotland to offer leadership and present new ways of thinking about our place and influence in the world, an approach – as previously stated – that must be strategic, explicit about its priorities, and informed by a clear set of policies, values and objectives.** <sup>169</sup>
167. **We believe this to be crucial in order for the Parliament and wider public to seek answers to such fundamental questions as how we should engage internationally, why, with whom, and to what effect.**

## **Funding approach and best value**

168. The largest increase within the International and European Relations budget is a £1.5 million uplift to the International Development fund which will be worth £11.5 million in 2022-23.
169. The Scotland Malawi Partnership welcomed the increase in the International Development Fund to £15 million per year. However, in terms of achieving value for money, they wrote—
- ” “The Scottish Government achieves greatest value for money where it applies something different and innovates, where it challenges norms and assumptions, and where it looks to work in a collegiate, collective and collaborative manner with civic society.” <sup>170</sup>
170. They were critical of the move to a having a mix of competitive and non-competitive funding opportunities for the international development fund; suggesting competitive calls were the “most transparent and effective mode of grant-making”. It encouraged the Scottish Government to prioritise competitive calls and detail the proportion of grants made via a competitive process and those not. <sup>171</sup>
171. Furthermore—
- ” “It is hugely important that the process is predictable, transparent and accountable. Following that approach will deliver the best value for money.” <sup>172</sup>
172. **The Committee invites the Scottish Government to provide a breakdown of its current international development grants in respect of the process followed i.e. competitive and non-competitive, and the rationale for that approach.**

## **Small grants**

173. The Scotland Malawi Partnership was critical of the decision to cancel the Small Grants Programme <sup>173</sup>, describing the programme as “probably one of the best bits of what the Scottish Government has achieved” in its international development

work over 16-17 years. They said the impact of the programme could be seen delivering not only project grants but capacity-building grants and grants allowing organisations to undertake research and plan projects informed by local knowledge.  
174

174. They felt the criticism of there being no clear evidence of success against the objectives of the programme was due to “the way in which the objectives were written at the beginning of the process”, adding—

” “I have looked at the rest of the international grant programme and I am not convinced that all the other units have easily measurable objectives. I think that that is a fair point and improvements can probably be made in that regard. However, I certainly do not think that that is a reason to have cancelled the small grants programme.”<sup>175</sup>

175. The Cabinet Secretary said an evaluation had found the scheme was not delivering the desired impact and also the Malawi Government had asked for “a smaller number of larger programmes”—

” “If it is not working in the way that we intended, we have to pivot and ensure that we deliver in the way that we want with our partners in our partner countries.”<sup>176</sup>

176. The Scottish Government said that “one of the critical *raison d'être*” of the programme was “to provide some very small organisations in Scotland with capability support so that they could start to access much larger grants”. However, just one organisation from eight grants had managed to achieve that, and despite an expectation of 150 grants “in the end there were only 80”. They also pointed to “evidence globally” that a number of smaller projects rather than some bigger ones “does not create more innovation or impact”.<sup>177</sup>

177. Furthermore—

” “We will continue to support our partner countries in the three areas of concentration for the small grants programme, which were in health, education and economic development.”<sup>178</sup>

178. The Minister for Culture Europe and International Development wrote to the Committee on 1 March 2022 to further elaborate on the Scottish Government's position. He said a key intention of the project was to enable civil society bodies to grow and bid “for larger elements of Scottish financing”. However, this had only been achieved in one case over five years. The Minister agreed there had been “a range of very positive initiatives” but suggested 80 grants spread over 12 countries, Scotland included, and with an average of £30,000 was “very challenging to monitor, evaluate and also assure the tax payer of appropriate risk management”. He added that demand from the sector had been underwhelming, leading to the £500,000 yearly budget not being spent in full in any year during the project.<sup>179</sup>

179. He said—

” “We continue to place great value on the role of civil society in Scotland, and the appetite for global citizenship in our local communities, staff in our public bodies including NHS Scotland, and private sector companies too.”<sup>180</sup>

180. The letter cited that 8% of the International Development Fund annually goes to core funding for a range of networking bodies supporting global citizenship in Scotland and Malawi – including the Scotland Malawi Partnership and its sister organisation the Malawi Partnership, as well as Scotland's International Development Alliance and the Scottish Fair Trade Forum.<sup>181</sup>

181. The Minister said he would be meeting with Scotland's International Development Alliance and the other core-funded networking bodies which the Scottish Government core funds—

” “I am keen to hear from them their thoughts on how we can support and engage with civil society following closure of [the] Small Grants programme with a view to future more impactful programming.”<sup>182</sup>

182. He emphasised that the Scottish Government was “looking to localise ever more of our assistance within the Global south” – with “a new focus on tackling gender equality” and principles developed with partner countries and civic society – and undertook to keep the Committee informed.<sup>183</sup>

183. **The decision to cancel the Small Grants Programme has not been without criticism. The Committee heard the rationale given by the Scottish Government and note the further information provided in the Minister in his letter of 1 March. We ask to be kept updated on any further developments, including the outcomes of the Minister's planned discussions with the core-funded networking organisations as mentioned in that correspondence.**

184. **The view of the Committee – while understanding the logic of the process and the criteria applied – is that it should still be possible to enable a role for small initiatives i.e. those innovative and community-led projects which have the potential to grow into bigger undertakings and attract more funding. Once the Minister has discussed next steps with the relevant partner organisations, we ask him to write to us again, setting out what support the Scottish Government can provide for the growth of such grass-roots initiatives.**

## Role of Parliament

185. Scrutiny of international development spend was something addressed by Scotland's International Development Alliance, who saw room for improvement in the interest both of best value and policy coherence—

” “We cannot see value for money unless we see it as connected to everything else that is going on in the Scottish context and, again, the Parliament has a role in ensuring that that happens.”<sup>184</sup>

186. They proposed “a normative approach” to “inflation-proof the budget and drive

towards political consensus, saying that more scrutiny was “essential”.<sup>185</sup>

187. **The Committee very much recognises the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of international development spend, particularly in light of the increase in the scale of the funding plus the changes introduced by the 2021 Review of International Development Policy. Transparency on the part of the Scottish Government will be crucial for that scrutiny, but we will consider all the tools at the Parliament’s disposal. We will work with colleagues in the Financial Scrutiny Unit to explore options for scrutiny over the remainder of this parliamentary session.**

# Annexe A

This Annexe sets out the various strategies, frameworks and policy statements relevant to the Scottish Government's international work.

## National Performance Framework

If national strategy and policy making were viewed as a pyramid, the NPF would be the apex. Since its introduction in 2007, as part of a Spending Review, it has been developed as an outcomes-based framework underpinning the Scottish Government's entire policy agenda.<sup>186</sup>

The NPF's purpose is to—

- create a more successful country
- give opportunities to all people living in Scotland
- increase the wellbeing of people living in Scotland
- create sustainable and inclusive growth
- reduce inequalities and give equal importance to economic, environmental and social progress<sup>187</sup>

To help achieve its purpose, the NPF sets out National Outcomes that describe the kind of Scotland it aims to create. The primary National Outcome for international policy is—

“We are open, connected and make a positive contribution internationally.”<sup>188</sup>

That outcome is set in the context of fulfilling obligations internationally, promoting Scotland globally, and enhancing our relationships with other nations; and as described under the heading of ‘Vision’—

“We are regarded as a vibrant, modern country and have positive international relations, influence and exchange networks. We recognise the inter-connectedness of people and the obligations which flow from this and play a valuable role in providing aid and supporting developing countries. We are committed to promoting peace, democracy and human rights globally.”

The second relevant National Outcome, under the economy heading, is—

“We have a globally competitive, entrepreneurial, inclusive and sustainable economy.”<sup>189</sup>

To achieve the National Outcomes, the aim of the NPF is for Scotland to work together, meaning—

- national and local government
- businesses
- voluntary organisations

- people living in Scotland

Also, of relevance here are the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, specifically—

- Gender equality
- Industry, innovation and infrastructure
- Reduced inequalities
- Peace, justice and strong institutions
- Partnerships for the goals<sup>190</sup>

## Current International Framework

The current iteration was published in December 2017 and sets out two overarching objectives—

- To create an environment within Scotland that supports a better understanding of international opportunities and a greater appetite and ability to seize them, and
- To influence the world around us on the issues that matter most in helping Scotland flourish.<sup>191</sup>

It includes objectives, outcomes and ambitions for Scotland, and for its businesses and institutions, informed by five engagement strategies—

- [US engagement strategy](#)
- [China engagement strategy](#)
- [Canada engagement strategy](#)
- [India engagement strategy](#)
- [Pakistan engagement strategy](#)

In the cases of the United States, China and Canada, these strategies are intended to complement and inform the work of the Scottish Government's international offices in these three countries, which the Scottish Government has described as priority locations.

In the cases of both India and Pakistan, one of the key reasons identified by the Scottish Government for the development of strategies is the presence of large Indian and Pakistani communities in Scotland. These engagement strategies each include actions under three of the four strategic objectives identified in the International Framework: relationships and partnerships; reputation and attractiveness; and global outlook.

The strategic objectives in full are—

- Relationships and partnerships – to strengthen Scotland's external relationships, roles and networks. This includes links with governance bodies in Scotland's identified

priority countries along with working with Scottish diaspora in the priority countries;

- Reputation and attractiveness – to build Scotland's reputation and international attractiveness. This includes working to promote Scotland's culture and values, boost Scotland's export performance, ensuring that Scotland remains an attractive location for investment and building on Scotland's education research capability;
- Global outlook – to enhance Scotland's global outlook which should make Scotland a more attractive place to visit and do business with. This focusses on, amongst other areas, developing trade and investment links and supporting education links; and
- European Union – to protect Scotland's place in Europe. This focusses on the Scottish Government's aim "to protect and further strengthen our relationships with European partners to develop and deliver mutually beneficial outcomes, policies and programmes in pursuit of our objectives".<sup>192</sup>

The outcomes and ambitions are intended to measure delivery of the International Framework and also applicable to the five country strategies. They come under three headings<sup>193</sup> —

#### Our People

- Are better able to engage in a global world.
- Are engaged in international exchanges and learning opportunities.
- Are aware of the international environment and Scotland's place in the world.

#### Our Businesses & Institutions

- Are more globally competitive.
- Are able to cooperate with international partners to exchange knowledge and best practice.
- Are able to maximise and take advantage of export and trade opportunities.
- Are innovative and able to access international funding opportunities

#### Our Scotland

- Our economy is stronger and more resilient, there are greater employment opportunities and inequality is reduced.
- Our economic, educational, cultural and heritage strengths are globally recognised, supporting our positive international reputation.
- Our physical and digital connectivity is strengthened and Scotland is viewed as an attractive location to invest in and visit.
- Our international partners are supported in achieving our mutual goals. We show leadership and contribute to reducing global inequality and poverty.
- Our bilateral, multilateral and institutional relationships are strong and we are able to promote our interests overseas.

## Engaging with the EU

In respect of international priorities, developing a post-Brexit relationship with the European Union has been a significant focus of the Scottish Government. It has sought to base the objective of its European and international relations policies on pursuing benefits for Scotland in areas of devolved competence and primarily to boost international trade.

In January 2020, the Scottish Government published *The European Union's Strategic Agenda 2020-2024: Scotland's Perspective*. This set out why the Scottish Government considers the EU's priorities are of importance to Scotland and how Scotland can contribute to their delivery.<sup>194</sup>

The Scottish Government suggested there are opportunities for Scotland in engaging with the EU's work in the following priority areas—

- promoting progressive, democratic values on the world stage
- addressing the challenges presented by the global climate emergency
- promoting the wellbeing of all of society
- creating smart economies which thrive by the intelligent and humane use of new technologies<sup>195</sup>

Furthermore, the Scottish Government set out the ways in which it would seek to work with the EU following Brexit, including—

- proactive and constructive engagement with the EU institutions and other multilateral organisations
- active bilateral collaboration with member states
- robust and constructive engagement with the UK Government and the other devolved governments to protect Scotland's interests and shape the UK Government's approach to influencing the EU and future international activity<sup>196</sup>

To highlight this ambition further, in March 2021 the Scottish Government published the policy document *Steadfastly European, Scotland's past, present and future*, which set out the action plan in the months and years to come.<sup>197</sup>

In December 2020 the Scottish Parliament passed the *European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Act 2021*. This provides Ministers with powers to help meet the Scottish Government's commitment that Scottish laws 'keep pace' with future developments in EU law where appropriate.<sup>198</sup>

The *Programme for Government for 2021-22* stated—

"With a view to re-joining the EU as soon as we are able to, we will preserve Scotland's good relations with the EU and implement our commitment to align with EU standards and laws, and we will affirm the need for international cooperation to solve global issues."<sup>199</sup>

## International Offices

That international engagement is supported by a network of international offices across eight countries supplemented by Scottish Development International's footprint with over 30 offices across the globe.<sup>200</sup>

Following the Brexit vote, the Scottish Government has sought to further develop its international footprint, opening new offices in London, Berlin and Paris. These offices complemented the Scottish Government's existing offices in Brussels, Dublin, Beijing, Ottawa and Washington DC.<sup>201</sup>

In its *Programme for Government 2021-22*, the Scottish Government committed to strengthening its Brussels office and to opening a Scottish Government Office in Copenhagen to enhance Scotland's visibility in the Nordic countries. They also committed to opening an office in Warsaw during the lifetime of the Parliament.<sup>202</sup>

The Scottish Government have set out five main objectives for the network of international offices—

- improving Scotland's international profile
- attracting investment to Scotland
- helping businesses to trade internationally
- promoting and securing Scottish research and innovation capability, partnerships and funding
- protecting and enhancing Scotland's interests in the EU and beyond<sup>203</sup>

They stated that—

“these strategic objectives form the basis of the network's business planning processes and their local objectives will be drawn from these themes, which themselves are grounded in Scotland's International Framework, Economic Strategy and the National Performance Framework, in particular the national outcomes of—

- we have a globally competitive entrepreneurial, inclusive and sustainable economy
- we are open, connected and make a positive contribution internationally”<sup>204</sup>

The Cabinet Secretary told the Committee that international offices—

“attract investment, broaden our horizons, and create domestic opportunities and benefits for people in Scotland, and they do so at a very marginal cost in the context of the Scottish Government's budget.”<sup>205</sup>

According to the Scottish Government, the “governance structures” of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) would enable their officials in the Brussels office to engage with the UK Government counterparts and promote Scotland's interests “and in some cases attend Specialised Committee meetings”. Also—

“...the EU Office team has regular dialogue with counterparts in the UK Mission in

Brussels, across a range of EU facing topics. This dialogue is both structured (i.e. via regular meetings), and more ad hoc and informal.”<sup>206</sup>

The Berlin office is described as promoting and supporting “key Scottish connections and friends of Scotland networks, including Global Scots, alumni networks and affinity diaspora, and showcases Scotland's distinct cultural heritage through events, including Scotland's food and drink, music, indigenous languages and literature”.<sup>207</sup>

Furthermore, the head of the Scottish Government's London office stated that the good working relationships that civil servants working in the Hubs have with staff at the British embassies can assist with providing information on sensitive diplomatic reporting that otherwise might be difficult to obtain.<sup>208</sup>

## Cultural Diplomacy Strategy

The *Programme for Government 2021-22*<sup>209</sup> included a commitment to develop a Cultural Diplomacy Strategy. The EU Director of the Scottish Government's Brussels office told us this was being developed, the aim being to address how to—

“...open conversations, make connections, and promote Scotland in the widest sense, but they also ultimately lead to strong diplomatic outcomes.”<sup>210</sup>

The Head of the Scottish Government's Berlin office echoed this, saying that through soft diplomacy work they are able to showcase Scottish talent and provide opportunities to expand their business abroad – e.g. by enabling Scottish musicians to meet with agents during a St Andrew's Day event.<sup>211</sup>

Similarly, the British Council stressed that it is key to have a unifying international strategy that brings everything together in order to make the most of the innovation and investment hub network.<sup>212</sup>

## International Education Strategy

In the *Programme for Government 2021-22*, the Scottish Government committed to produce a new strategy to promote international education, increase international student numbers, and maintain links with the EU—

“We will also develop a Scottish Education Exchange Programme to support the international mobility of staff and learners, and work to re-secure Scotland's access to the Erasmus + Programme.”<sup>213</sup>

In their written submissions Universities Scotland<sup>214</sup> and British Council Scotland<sup>215</sup> supported this new strategy, the former describing it as—

“...an important opportunity to bring together and connect a number of strands of international issues for the sector, some that sit outwith the higher education portfolio, such as transnational education (TNE) and foreign direct investment.”<sup>216</sup>

They added that the strategy would need to consider not only how to attract foreign students but also how to retain talent in Scotland; and highlighted the need for a correlation between the different portfolios so that education feeds into all aspects of the government's work in a cohesive way.<sup>217</sup>

## Arctic Policy Framework

Seeking to develop closer links with the Arctic, the Arctic Policy Framework proposed cooperation in policy areas such as: education, research and innovation; cultural ties; rural connections; climate change, environment and clean energy and sustainable economic development.<sup>218</sup>

According to the ministerial foreword, written in 2019—

“We want to share Scottish expertise while underlining our desire to learn from others. This document is intended for both our international partners and Scotland-based organisations, who we encourage to look north for new collaborations and opportunities.”<sup>219</sup>

## Nordic and Baltic Policy Statement

Engagement with the Nordic and Baltic countries<sup>220</sup> is also prioritised, as set out in its Nordic Baltic Policy Statement (published in March 2014 and updated in September 2017)<sup>221</sup> —

“...the Nordic Baltic countries are established world leaders in areas such as marine affairs, energy and innovation, and social welfare. Scotland is making progress in many of the same areas, and we see engagement with these countries as an opportunity to promote our work in these areas further.”<sup>222</sup>

## A Feminist Foreign Policy

In 2021 the SNP's manifesto for the Scottish Parliament election committed to producing a refreshed international strategy, one that would—

“Create a new global affairs framework, underpinned by Scotland's fundamental values and priorities and adopt a feminist foreign policy.”<sup>223</sup>

According to a Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office paper from 2021, the countries most associated with having a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) are Sweden, Canada, France, Mexico and Spain—

“In theory, an FFP moves beyond gender mainstreaming in foreign development assistance to include: (1) a wider range of external actions, including defence, trade and diplomacy (2) a wider range of marginalised people, not just women. Within foreign

development assistance, it implies a more coherent and systematically institutionalised approach to gender mainstreaming.”<sup>224</sup>

In their written submission to the Committee, Professor Mills and Dr Birdsall encouraged the Scottish Government to persist with the aim of an FFP, seeking a “broader” approach to international policy “with human rights at its core” and a “long-term focus” on structural change—

“...the government would be well advised to work with civil society to move beyond using FFP as a ‘brand’ that generates interest and develop a coherent policy that is transformative, rights-based and non-partisan.”<sup>225</sup>

- 1 <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/business-items/inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments-international-work>
- 2 <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/business-items/inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments-international-work>
- 3 Published responses for Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space
- 4 <https://www.parliament.scot/-/media/files/committees/constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/spice-inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments--summary-of-written-evidence.pdf>
- 5 <https://www.parliament.scot/-/media/files/committees/constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/03022022-spice-paper-summary-of-written-and-oral-evidence.pdf>
- 6 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13469&parent=%2Fsites%2Fcttee%2Ds6%2Dceeac%2Finquiries%2Finquiry%20into%20the%20Scottish%20Government%E2%80%99s%20international%20work%2FReport>
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- 9 <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-international-framework-9781788514033/>
- 10 Official Report, 3 Feb 2022, Col 32
- 11 For example, RSE's view that "Engagement with the European Union remains critically important, for economic, political and cultural reasons" - [Response 1034419027 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#) – EMI5 seeing "Scotland's future as a fully engaged nation within the EU and would urge the Scottish Government to work with that goal in mind in its own engagement" – [Response 102508122 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#) - or Glasgow Caledonian University suggesting "The Scottish Government should make every efforts to continue its engagement with Europe" - [Response 683102964 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 12 [Response 434182519 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 13 [spice-inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments--summary-of-written-evidence.pdf \(parliament.scot\)](#)
- 14 [Response 1034419027 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)

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- 16 [Scotland's Global Standpoint: Strategic Principles for Scotland's European and International Relations](#)
- 17 Official Report, 25 Nov 2021, Col 12
- 18 [Response 1034419027 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
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- 20 [Submission from the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities on the call for views into the Scottish Government's international work | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 21 Official Report, 25 Nov 2021, Col 12
- 22 [spice-inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments--summary-of-written-evidence.pdf \(parliament.scot\)](#)
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- 27 [IGR\\_Agreement3.pdf \(parliament. Scot\)](#)
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- 29 See paragraphs 103-105 on aligning domestic policy with external action
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- 34 [Steadfastly European, Scotland's past, present and future - gov.scot \(www.gov.scot\)](#)
- 35 [UK EU Parliamentary Partnership Assembly | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
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- 37 [Response 1034419027 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 38 [Response 616614941 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 39 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13469>
- 40 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13434>
- 41 A third country is a country that is not a member of the EU as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the EU right to free movement
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- 103 [Submission from Professor Kurt Mills and Dr Andrea Birdsall](#)
- 104 [Submission from Professor Kurt Mills and Dr Andrea Birdsall](#)
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- 131 [Scotland's Global Standpoint: Strategic Principles for Scotland's European and International Relations](#)
- 132 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13571>
- 133 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13488>
- 134 <https://www.parliament.scot/api/sitecore/CustomMedia/OfficialReport?meetingId=13488>
- 135 Official Report, 16 Dec 2021, Col 32
- 136 A practitioner-academic or academic-practitioner is someone who is both an academic and an active practitioner in their subject area
- 137 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 21
- 138 "We will support the establishment of a Scottish Council for Global Affairs to develop critical thinking on international issues and Scotland's place in the world" [SNP Manifesto 2021, p.139](#)
- 139 [Response 1034419027 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 140 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 2
- 141 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 9
- 142 It was suggested by a member of the Committee that this was an indirect reference to Raytheon UK, a defence company account managed by Scottish Enterprise - Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 13
- 143 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 8
- 144 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 2
- 145 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 8
- 146 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 22
- 147 [Response 920927693 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 148 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 7
- 149 See paragraph 35 on raising public awareness
- 150 See paragraphs 103-105
- 151 Official Report, 25 Nov 2021, Col 12

- 152 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 17 and 23
- 153 [Response 920927693 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 154 [International development programme - review: summary report - gov.scot \(www.gov.scot\)](#)
- 155 Official Report, 3 Mar 2022, Col 28
- 156 [Climate Justice Fund | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 157 [Response 920927693 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 158 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 16
- 159 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Cols 5 and 16-17
- 160 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Cols 17-18
- 161 [Response 787930163 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 162 [Response 604646277 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 163 Official Report, 25 Nov 2021, Cols 6-7 and 14
- 164 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 6
- 165 Official Report, 3 Mar 2022, Cols 29-30
- 166 Official Report, 13 Jan 2021, Cols 11-12 and 18-19
- 167 [Response 417297969 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 168 See paragraphs 31-35 and 98 on policy integration and prioritisation
- 169 See paragraphs 31-35 and 98 on policy integration and prioritisation
- 170 [Response 604646277 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 171 [Response 604646277 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 172 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Col 20
- 173 [Response 604646277 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 174 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Cols 11-12
- 175 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Cols 12-13

- 176 Official Report, 3 Feb 2022, Cols 32-33
- 177 Official Report, 3 Feb 2022, Col 33
- 178 Official Report, 3 Feb 2022, Col 33
- 179 [Letter from the Scottish Government, 1 March 2022](#)
- 180 [Letter from the Scottish Government, 1 March 2022](#)
- 181 [Letter from the Scottish Government, 1 March 2022](#)
- 182 [Letter from the Scottish Government, 1 March 2022](#)
- 183 [Letter from the Scottish Government, 1 March 2022](#)
- 184 Official Report, 13 Jan 2022, Cols 20-21
- 185 [Response 417297969 to Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 186 <https://spice-spotlight.scot/2022/03/11/guest-blog-the-national-performance-framework-new-report-on-accountability-and-incentives/>
- 187 <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/what-it>
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- 189 <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/economy>
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- 193 Scottish Government. (2017, December 8). Scotland's International Framework. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-international-framework-9781788514033/>
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- 200 See also paragraphs 68-72 and 106-113 on international offices
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