




The Scottish Parliament  
Pàrlamaid na h-Alba

Published 29 October 2024  
SP Paper 668  
4th Report, 2024 (Session 6)

## **Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee**

# **National Outcomes: Response to the Review of Outcomes and Indicators relating to the Scottish Government's International Work**



**Published in Scotland by the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body.**

---

All documents are available on the Scottish Parliament website at:  
<http://www.parliament.scot/abouttheparliament/91279.aspx>

For information on the Scottish Parliament contact Public Information on:  
Telephone: 0131 348 5000  
Textphone: 0800 092 7100  
Email: [sp.info@parliament.scot](mailto:sp.info@parliament.scot)

# Contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>The National Performance Framework, National Outcomes and National Indicators</b>	<b>3</b>
International National Outcomes	3
Aims and objectives	4
Evidence taken on the International National Outcome	5
The Scottish Government's view	8
Recommendations	9
National Indicators	10
General views	10
The six National Indicators	12
The Scottish Government's view	15
Recommendations	16
<b>International offices</b>	<b>18</b>
Soft power	18
Global branding	19
Evaluating the outcomes	19
Multilevel aspects	21
Experience of other sub-states	23
Engaging the diaspora	25
The Scottish Government's view	27
Recommendations	28
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Annexe A</b>	<b>31</b>
The Committee's previous work	31
The Scottish Government's response and other documents	32
Response to the Committee's report	32
The Global Affairs Framework	32
The Scottish Connections Framework	33
Taking a feminist approach to international relations: position paper	33
International network: annual report 2022-2023	34
Scotland's International Strategy	34
Scotland's International Education Strategy	35
Inspiring Connections: Scotland's International Culture Strategy	35
Contribution to international development: report 2021 to 2023	36

Annexe B: Membership changes _____	36
<b>Bibliography</b> _____	<b>38</b>

# Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee

To consider and report on the following (and any additional matter added under Rule 6.1.5A)—

- (a) the Scottish Government's EU and external affairs policy;
- (b) policy in relation to the UK's exit from the EU;
- (c) the international activities of the Scottish Administration, including international development; and
- (d) any other matter falling within the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture and any matter relating to intergovernmental relations within the responsibility of the Deputy First Minister.



[CEEAC.committee@parliament.scot](mailto:CEEAC.committee@parliament.scot)



0131 348 5971

# Committee Membership



**Convener**  
**Clare Adamson**  
Scottish National Party



**Deputy Convener**  
**Alexander Stewart**  
Scottish Conservative  
and Unionist Party



**George Adam**  
Scottish National Party



**Neil Bibby**  
Scottish Labour



**Keith Brown**  
Scottish National Party



**Patrick Harvie**  
Scottish Green Party



**Stephen Kerr**  
Scottish Conservative  
and Unionist Party

# Introduction

1. This report details the findings of the Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee (“the Committee”) from its [inquiry](#) into the Scottish Government’s National Outcomes and Indicators relating to international policy.
2. The inquiry was undertaken in anticipation of the Scottish Government’s review of National Outcomes and subsequent [Consultation with Parliament in connection with the Review of National Outcomes](#) which was lodged with the Parliament on 1 May 2024. This report is the Committee’s submission to that consultation.
3. Beginning on [1 June 2023](#) with a session with the Scottish Council on Global Affairs (“SCOGA”) <sup>1</sup> and followed by input from a range of other witnesses during the last 12 months, we concluded this piece of work with evidence from the Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture (“the Cabinet Secretary”) on [20 June 2024](#). The Committee also looked at the approaches of both the Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government to international policy during a visit to Belfast and Dublin in November 2023, meeting with academics, businesses, government officials and parliamentarians in both cities.
4. The inquiry also builds on a previous piece of work this session, the Committee’s [Inquiry into the Scottish Government’s International Work](#), on which we reported in April 2022. Since that report was published, there have been a series of Scottish Government documents relating to its international work. That earlier Committee report and those Scottish Government documents are outlined in **Annexe A**, and referenced elsewhere in the text where relevant, but in summary—
  - *The Global Affairs Framework* – published in May 2022 – set out the principles underpinning international work and the basis on which international activity was prioritised
  - The Response to the Committee’s report – June 2022 – accepted the Committee’s recommendation to publish an Annual Report addressing the contribution made by the international offices
  - *The Scottish Connections Framework* – April 2023 – set out the approach to engaging with Scotland’s diaspora
  - *Taking a feminist approach to international relations: position paper* – November 2023 – set out the scope for adopting a feminist approach to international relations
  - *International network: annual report 2022-2023* – December 2023 – first such report highlighting the work of the international offices
  - *Scotland’s International Strategy* – January 2024 – set out the approach to international engagement to the end of the current parliamentary term
  - *Scotland’s International Education Strategy* – February 2024 – set out a vision for the global promotion of Scotland’s universities and colleges
  - *Inspiring Connections: Scotland’s International Culture Strategy* – March 2024



- set out a focus for developing international cultural engagement
  - *Contribution to international development: report 2021 to 2023 – June 2024* – looked at a cross-section of the Scottish Government's international development activity
5. The current wording of the National Outcomes and Indicators covering international policy, and the evidence we heard pertaining to this, as well as the content of and narrative informing the Scottish Government's proposed changes, are set out in the first part of this report.
  6. The second part of the report focuses on the work of the Scottish Government's international offices and any issues directly related to international policy not previously covered in the first part.
  7. The Committee wishes to thank all those individuals and organisations who contributed to this inquiry and helped to inform the evidence and our findings.



# The National Performance Framework, National Outcomes and National Indicators

8. [The National Performance Framework](#) (“NPF”) is a strategic tool, first introduced by the Scottish Government in 2007, which “sets out a vision for the collective wellbeing of Scotland”.<sup>2</sup> A “proxy for progress towards” the [United Nations Sustainable Development Goals](#) (“SDGs”), the NPF is also “a reporting framework that helps us understand, publicly and transparently, the progress we are making as a nation towards realising our long-term vision”.<sup>3</sup>
9. The NPF currently outlines [eleven National Outcomes](#) that “describe the kind of Scotland we want to see”<sup>4</sup>, the focus being on improving people’s lives.<sup>5</sup>
10. These National Outcomes are measured by a set of [81 National Indicators](#) to help us “measures Scotland’s progress” and “give a measure of national wellbeing”.<sup>6</sup>

## International National Outcomes

11. The most relevant National Outcome for this inquiry comes under the heading of *International* and the current wording states—  
 “We are open, connected and make a positive contribution internationally.”<sup>7</sup>
12. Under that current wording, the Scottish Government commits “to fulfilling our obligations internationally, promoting our place in the world and deepening our relationships with others”.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore—  
 “We are regarded as a vibrant, modern country and have positive international relations, influence and exchange networks. We recognise the inter-connectedness of people and the obligations which flow from this and play a valuable role in providing aid and supporting developing countries. We are committed to promoting peace, democracy and human rights globally.”<sup>8</sup>
13. Beneath the current International National Outcome are six National Indicators—
  - A Positive Experience for People Coming to live in Scotland – intended to measure one important dimension of migrants’ experiences in Scotland: a strong sense of belonging
  - Scotland’s Population – measures the number of council areas experiencing population decline.
  - Scotland’s Reputation – intended to measure Scotland’s reputation against
  - 60 countries across the world on the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands IndexSM (NBISM)

- International relationships – indicator under development
  - Contribution of development support to other nations – a composite that measures Scotland's international development activities
  - Trust in public organisations – indicator under development<sup>9</sup>
14. There is also an indicator for international trade relevant to the Scottish Government's international policies but outside of this Committee's remit—
- International exporting – measures the annual value of international exports (not including the rest of the UK or Oil and Gas exports) as published in Export Statistics Scotland<sup>10</sup>

### Commissioned research

15. As part of its earlier consultation process, the Scottish Government wished to “ensure the voices of children were included” in the review, and commissioned research from the Children's Parliament. The conclusion for the International National Outcome was—
- ” “This national outcome could do more to acknowledge that every citizen, including children, can contribute to creating a nation that is outward facing, internationalist and committed to social justice. Being part of a global family that seeks to make rights real for children we would suggest that this national outcome needs to make more of the phrase which closes the current text, this would mean putting these words front and centre in our national outcome: We are committed to promoting peace, democracy and human rights globally.”<sup>11</sup>

### Aims and objectives

16. Before addressing the International National Outcome and Indicators directly, we should consider the aims and objectives of the Scottish Government's international work and how these link to the NPF.
17. As stated in our 2022 report, the Committee recommended that the Scottish Government should be strategic in approach, explicit about its priorities, and informed by a clear set of policies, values and objectives. The importance of policy coherence i.e., the harmonisation of policy between the domestic and the outward facing was a recurrent theme of that piece of work, reliant on an understanding of the international agenda across the Scottish Government and in the public realm.<sup>12</sup>
18. In response to our report, the Cabinet Secretary said that the *Global Affairs Framework* recognised “the linkages between our domestic work and is rooted in the National Performance Framework.” The *Global Affairs Framework* also set out “the values and principles underpinning the Scottish Government's international work and the basis on which the Scottish Government will prioritise its international activity”. The aim was to support the domestic agenda, including the “creation of good, green jobs, reducing child poverty, gender and other inequalities at home and overseas”, and contribute to the achievement of the National Outcomes and the as well as the SDGs.<sup>13</sup>

19. *Scotland's International Strategy*, published in January this year, superseded the *Global Affairs Framework* and referenced the impact of “global challenges and events” and the “need to remain engaged internationally”. It sought to “deliver tangible benefits to the people of Scotland” while also stressing the importance of Scotland “being a good global citizen” and how clarity of “values, priorities and actions” could “ensure that our international work makes a substantial, positive impact not only on the lives of people in Scotland, but also those on whom our international development engagement is focused”. The three key policy areas outlined were—
- economy, trade and investment
  - climate change, biodiversity and renewable energy and
  - reputation, influence and relationships<sup>14</sup>
20. The ministerial foreword to *Scotland's International Strategy* summarised the approach as—
- ” “Scotland needs to work to deepen ties with key partners, increase economic opportunities and build on our excellent networks for both Scotland’s benefit and that of our international partners.”<sup>14</sup>

## Evidence taken on the International National Outcome

” “*We are open, connected and make a positive contribution internationally*”

21. Questions about what it meant to be “open”, “connected” and “make a positive contribution internationally” led to discussion of soft power<sup>i 15</sup>, the role of a good global citizen, and the importance of strategic narratives. All these themes were explored with SCOGA at the outset of the current inquiry.
22. Professor Gethins suggested all nations “seek to boost their soft power to deliver both political influence and economic opportunity at home” and that this could be “closely linked to the country’s brand”. Scotland had “a particular opportunity” given the strength of its brand when it came to “food and drink, education and culture, tourism, sport etc”.<sup>16</sup> He stressed though that the importance of being a good global citizen not just in “how we sell ourselves internationally” but also in the domestic realm if we are asking people in Scotland to “make sacrifices...and change the way we live”.<sup>17</sup> The connection between the local and international, according to Professor Jackson, could help to mobilise the support of people for tackling climate change and other “matters such as human rights or the war in Ukraine”, enabling them to feel “involved in a global effort”.<sup>18</sup> Professor Kaarbo cited work that was trying to add to ideas of soft power “with notions of strategic narratives or

---

<sup>i</sup> According to the British Council: “Countries, regions and cities around the world are using soft power to improve international relations and bolster trade and tourism”. In contrast to hard power, which uses coercive means, whether military or economic, soft power “relies on attraction and persuasion to change behaviour and influence international events.”

communication power". This was about saying "who we are, what role we want to play in the world, how we want to play it and why, and where we fit in with others".

<sup>17</sup>

23. When members of the Committee visited Dublin in November 2023, Irish Government officials told us that a "national or grand narrative" had to be credible, both at home and abroad, as well as nuanced to match different international regions. Also, that on St Patrick's Day every minister of the Irish Government travelled abroad to promote a shared message, encompassing most recently their support for Ukraine, the promotion of culture and trade, and a sense of values (such as internationalism, creativity, and community).<sup>ii</sup>
24. Professor Kaarbo thought the idea of "being a good global citizen" could be developed further<sup>18</sup> and that it was "not about preaching to the rest of the world" but could be initiating a conversation about policy and learning.<sup>18</sup> Supporting human rights in situations in which "violations are obvious and glaring", for example, could "be part of the wider strategic narrative", enabling the Scottish Government to "reinforce and amplify UK policy" and make its own voice heard.<sup>18</sup> She told us that the opposite of a good global citizen would involve an "isolationist view" that did not recognise the interconnectedness between nations. There was "no single standard... We just have to avoid the bad".<sup>18</sup>
25. Professor Gethins agreed that "no one size fits all"<sup>18</sup> and highlighted the "groundbreaking work" of the NGO Beyond Borders Scotland<sup>19</sup> with "women peacebuilders around the world".<sup>18</sup> In a speech given in 2017 by the founder of that organisation, Mark Muller Stuart KC made the case that with a strong brand and identity, the story it had to tell, and its cultural resources, Scotland could make a "profound contribution" to "peacebuilding, conflict resolution and wider cultural exchange between different nations, cultures and religions".<sup>20</sup>
26. VisitScotland found the concept of the good global citizen "helpful" but sought clarity about the definition and "the proof points".<sup>21</sup> European Merchants sought to define the meaning of a good global citizen in terms of the balance of "values and interests" as well as of that between "what Scotland does domestically with what it does internationally".<sup>21</sup> Everyone faced contradictions e.g., ambitious targets to tackle climate change while having economically benefited from fossil fuels. The temptation was "to ignore all the negatives and focus only on the positives". However, a balanced and honest approach would be more credible, including "accepting criticism" from others where it was justified—

---

ii The Committee visited Belfast and Dublin in November 2023, as part of this inquiry and work on the Trade and Co-operation Agreement, meeting with officials, parliamentarians, academics, businesses and cultural organisations

- ” “It is not sustainable for Scotland or the UK – or any country – to expound on virtues and values that we say are important when other countries do not live up to certain standards if we do not accept criticism from anyone else if we do not meet those same standards ourselves.”<sup>21</sup>
27. Professor Cornago spoke of “criticisms in the Basque Parliament” that their approach to external relations gave “too much focus on trade and investment” over “the wider non-political agenda”.<sup>22</sup> The Basque Government had 80 international offices for trade and investment “attached to a very important network of global development” and a diaspora network “involved in the promotion of the Basque language and culture”. However, there was a sense that “the pragmatic approach is displacing a more political and social agenda”.<sup>22</sup> He described how the Basque President had previously sought to promote its international reputation by using methodologies from the UN Development Programme, something “quite innovative” at the time. He stressed, however, that the “many benefits” of such an approach was “strongly dependent on the wider context”, political and economic, and “difficult to handle if the context is unstable”.<sup>22</sup>
28. The Scottish International Development Alliance (SIDA)<sup>iii</sup> underlined the importance of policy coherence and saw the National Outcomes as “the opportunity to think holistically and make sure that things are not contradicting each other”.<sup>23</sup> Oxfam was “very supportive” of the concept of National Outcomes, seen as “moving away from crude measures such as gross domestic product, and the development of a more meaningful wellbeing economy monitor”. There was though a caveat, in reference to research undertaken by SIDA which suggested “anecdotally” that “most public bodies” were “reporting after the event” rather than drawing on the National Outcomes or NPF to inform their decision-making process<sup>23</sup> —
- ” “...fundamentally, they do not drive policy and spending decisions. There is a complete disconnect between the vision of the National Outcomes [and the NPF] and the practice that happens—not all the time, but often.”<sup>23</sup>
29. We heard that “global responsibility” was the “most important” aspect of the international outcome but the indicators were “flawed”, the Scottish Government document focusing on the outcomes rather than the indicators, an approach which did “not accurately reflect what we could be doing as a good global citizen”. The change in emphasis, moving in the direction of “global impact” and a “wellbeing framework”, were welcomed by SIDA as “a step in the right direction” but “wellbeing in Scotland” could not be “at the expense of communities in other countries”, a theme it wished to see “reflected across the whole of the national outcomes.”<sup>23</sup> The “commitment to do no harm” (e.g., working with businesses not in breach of human rights regulations) was considered the bottom line but “the ambition” was to be “a good global citizen, which means having a positive impact on communities” (e.g.,

---

<sup>iii</sup> Most evidence in this report focuses on the current wording for the International National Outcome and Indicators, the exception being the session with the Scottish International Development Alliance, some of whose comments address the revised International National Outcome.

practicing and promoting fair trade).<sup>23</sup>

30. Arguing that wellbeing was a “collective long-term” endeavour, Oxfam said this was not something Scotland should pursue “at the expense of wellbeing elsewhere”,<sup>23</sup> and the concept “should appear front and centre” in a name change to the NPF.<sup>23</sup>

The “mild elephant in the room” was Brand Scotland<sup>24</sup>, with “potential inherent contradictions” between trading impact and global responsibility, and which, it said, “should sit within Scotland’s Economy Outcome” rather than the international one.<sup>23</sup>

31. Dr Long suggested that the wording of the new International National Outcome was “clear about the emphasis on good global citizenship” and should set “a clear trajectory” for the indicators that would follow.<sup>23</sup> Asked about striking a balance in how Scotland was perceived internationally, between our actions to make a positive contribution globally and being honest about areas where we could improve, he saw the need for “a national conversation” for which the National Outcomes and Indicators could help “frame that debate”.<sup>23</sup> He also sought a “coherence between what is thought about these questions in Scottish public life and the kinds of institutions and policies that are put in place”.<sup>23</sup>

## The Scottish Government’s view

### Consultation document

32. The new wording proposed by the Scottish Government in its consultation document is—

“We are connected, open, show leadership and make a positive contribution globally.”<sup>25</sup>

33. According to that document, the purpose of changing “internationally” to “globally” in the proposed wording is “to broaden the scope from a focus on the relationships between nations (‘international’) to wider environmental and social factors (‘global’)”.<sup>25</sup>

34. The vision underpinning the revised outcome is given as—

- ” “Being a good global citizen is a responsibility we all share. We recognise that we are all interconnected, within Scotland and across the globe. We understand that the decisions that impact our own wellbeing here and now will also have wider effects internationally and in the future.

We are committed to promoting peace, democracy and human rights globally. We provide global leadership through positive international relations, our support for international development and our climate action. We promote our place in the world and deepen our relationships with others, building influence and exchange networks. We collaborate to maximise the contribution of our research and innovation. We enhance our prosperity, and that of our businesses and industry, through international trade and supply chains.”<sup>25</sup>

35. There are no revised National Indicators in the Scottish Government’s consultation document, which states that “work is ongoing” and “will be completed once a revised set of National Outcomes has been agreed with Parliament”.<sup>25</sup>

### The Cabinet Secretary's evidence

36. The Cabinet Secretary told us he was “pleased” that the International National Outcome remained in the *consultation* document, “albeit with a slight shift in focus”, a shift related “to the twin crises of the climate and biodiversity emergencies”.<sup>26</sup> He explained the replacement of “internationally” by “globally” reflected that this was “an outcome not only between nations but in relation to the land, sea and air that we all share” and that “show leadership” was added “in recognition that Scotland has much to offer partners across the world in the transition to a growing greener and fairer economy”.<sup>26</sup>
37. He said that promoting Scotland internationally covered “exports, inward investment, tourism, education, culture and everything else that fits under the Brand Scotland umbrella” and “brings together our national agencies in a way that other countries are very jealous of”.<sup>26</sup>
38. Asked how Oxfam’s view that the NPF and National Outcomes did “not drive policy and spending decisions”<sup>23</sup> would inform his considerations, the Cabinet Secretary said he was “always open to suggestions” and “pleased that people want us to do more”.<sup>26</sup>

## Recommendations

39. **There was evidence from this inquiry to suggest that the National Outcomes do not always inform policy and spending, and that there can be a disconnect between the vision of the National Performance Framework and governmental decision making. The Committee therefore asks the Scottish Government to provide examples of where the National Outcomes have informed policy and spending decisions.**



40. **The success of soft power, as we heard during the course of the inquiry, is reliant on credibility and the balancing of values and interests; and tensions may arise when objectives clash or are perceived to come into conflict e.g., support for trade versus promoting human rights. The Committee's previous report on the Scottish Government's international work emphasised the importance of policy coherence – i.e., the harmonisation of policy between the domestic and the outward facing – and the necessity of an understanding of the international agenda across the Scottish Government and in the public realm. We ask the Scottish Government to set out how it will seek to sustain credibility and strike that balance between values and interests in its pursuit of soft power; whether for example by promoting a wider public conversation in Scotland, mainstreaming the international agenda across its directorates and agencies, or seeking the views of a “critical friend” in the form of a panel representing international NGOs and partners from the global south.**

41. ***Scotland's International Strategy* emphasises the importance of Scotland “being a good global citizen” and suggests that a clarity of “values, priorities and actions” can result in “a substantial, positive impact” on the lives of people in Scotland and beyond these shores. Given that “being a good global citizen” now sits at the beginning of the narrative beneath the revised wording to the International National Outcome, we ask the Scottish Government to elaborate on the meaning of this phrase in practical terms i.e., how it informs policy, and particularly “promoting peace, democracy and human rights globally” in respect of examples of its actions and assessment of their impact.**

## National Indicators

### General views

42. In general terms, the view of many of our witnesses was that evaluating the impact of the Scottish Government's international work presented a challenge. Professor Gethins told us—

” “...countries around the world that invest in their international profiles want to see some return, and committees like this one around the world want to scrutinise whether money is being well spent”.<sup>21</sup>

43. He cited the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index<sup>27</sup> as providing “an idea of something by which to measure the work” and suggested that “fundamentally, you are considering whether the work delivers jobs and investments for your constituents”.

<sup>18</sup> It might be hard to “find measurements” but possible to assess “whether that is money well spent” and “meeting the Government's objectives in a given area”.

The “trickier part” he said “was in deciding what to do less of priorities-wise”.<sup>18</sup>



44. Agreeing that measurement of outcomes was “difficult”, Professor Kaarbo suggested part of the problem was because “what happens in the international sphere is not under your control”, that it was about “how others receive what you are doing”. It was therefore even trickier to capture “than some National Outcomes”. However, she said there was “an obligation to assess, but assessment is different from measurement” and that criteria were required to understand how the actions of the Scottish Government “in external relations supports its goals and priorities”. This, she said, was “more to do with assessment criteria than it is to do with hard numbers”.<sup>18</sup>
45. Dr Long was of the view that indicators could be “blunt tools for steering policy” but that they were also “quite useful, because what gets measured gets done”. However, to avoid “people teaching to the test”, there should be “a framework of guidance and support” to ensure there’s “learning and the practice” as well as simply reporting.<sup>23</sup> He accepted that the “data science is very difficult” with “individual country-level attribution”.<sup>23</sup> Something might be possible “around measuring and aggregating the behaviour of firms across particular spheres” e.g., the garment industry where “work is being done by firms that have a substantial retail footprint in Scotland”. In terms of Scotland’s production the two areas which stood out and could be measured “in global-level metrics” were “arms exports and oil and gas exports”.<sup>23</sup> He also suggested “some concrete steps” on the environmental side citing the work of the Office for National Statistics and Zero Waste Scotland. He felt the “social and economic agenda takes a bit more work” but “could be approached creatively and in partnership”.<sup>23</sup>
46. He said the approach of the consultation was to “set the outcomes first and then develop indicators that reflect those outcomes”. In that way, the international outcome was “clear about the emphasis on good global citizenship” and “sets a clear trajectory”. However, the National Outcomes were “aspirational” and “designed to be readily communicable” but indicators could “track...what needs to be done”.<sup>23</sup>
47. SIDA made the point that although the Parliament can scrutinise the national outcomes every five years, there was “no parliamentary scrutiny of how we meet our indicators” and therefore—
- ” “There is currently a framework and an element of scrutiny, but all that is scrutinised is what we actually want to measure, not whether we have achieved it.”<sup>23</sup>
48. Its eight recommendations for the indicators in its *Scotland Spilling Over? Measuring Scotland’s Global Impact in the National Performance Framework* briefing paper were—
- Take account of international impact across the NPF Outcomes
  - Introduce an indicator on Scotland’s “material footprint” (to track the environmental footprint of Scotland’s raw material consumption)
  - Adopt an indicator that measures Scottish private sector impacts overseas

- Develop proxy indicators to track socio-economic impacts in Scotland's global value chains
  - Develop indicators for the NPF to track fossil fuels
  - Develop indicators for the NPF to track the arms trade
  - Develop a longer-term multi-stakeholder approach to apply spillover methodologies to Scotland
  - Measure Scotland's political voice (Scotland has a role in providing a voice on key global issues e.g., speaking out on loss and damage finance or in support of vaccine equity<sup>28</sup>)
49. Oxfam drew a connection between “meaningful measurement” and “alignment with the SDGs”, the latter having targets and the NPF not, though it did pre- 2018. Targets were “useful because they drive progress” and would help with the “scale of measurement within the NPF” (i.e., “worsening”, “maintaining” or “improving”)—
- ” “To use climate as the example, if you look at the NPF measurement of climate impact over the past six years it says that we have been improving the whole time, yet we have missed eight out of 12 targets and we have just scrapped our interim 2030 target.”<sup>23</sup>
50. Prosper said the indicators “could be reframed so that they were measured in a distance-to-frontier way” and wondered how Scotland might “measure up” to countries doing the best in a particular area “on a scale of say 1 to 100”.<sup>21</sup>
51. European Merchants suggested the benefits of adopting “a more strategic perspective” to international work were three-fold—
- ” “One is that it can prioritise where it will deploy its limited resources, and there will always be a limit on resources. Secondly, it can ensure that its work is delivered appropriately, and thirdly it will allow for the kind of measurability that we were speaking about.”<sup>21</sup>

## The six National Indicators

52. In the context of the NPF and the current International National Outcome, there are six National Indicators which are intended to measure progress, each of them addressed below in line with the evidence that the Committee heard.

### International relationships (previously International networks)

53. This National Indicator is still under development but, as the head of the Scottish Government's Copenhagen office told us, it was understood that one was “being developed and reviewed by colleagues” who wanted “to better align the data that we capture through annual reporting, as the committee requested”.<sup>29</sup>

54. In its written evidence, SCOGA suggested there were a number of measurable areas in which the Scottish Government could work with international partners to consider measuring impact, such as conflict resolution, Feminist Foreign Policy, the promotion of human rights and climate justice.<sup>16</sup>
55. Professor Jackson felt that SCOGA “might find a way to contribute to the enterprise of both supporting policy and trying to find measurements”, one possible example being a “report to map out international networks of engagement” across three sectors: business, the third sector, and education. A “before-and-after measurement” would be useful in his view though he offered the caveat that business “would be a big job...and quite difficult to do”.<sup>18</sup>
56. Professor Kaarbo pointed out there was no current indicator for networking despite there being methods for analysing this: “the density of the network, who is talking to whom, who is influencing whom, how that changes over time and what the shape of the network is”. Ultimately though “you still have to assess whether...the network meets your goals”.<sup>18</sup> She also encouraged making connections with other National Outcomes—
- ” “You cannot think about education without also thinking about international. You cannot think about the economy without also thinking about international”<sup>17</sup>
57. VisitScotland, European Merchants and Prosper broadly agreed that international networks would merit an indicator, one that was “a bit more outcome focused”, and it would help “to sharpen indicators”.<sup>21</sup>
58. In terms of evaluating networks, Prosper said it would “welcome metrics that are a bit more outcome focused” and that “we have had mixed feedback from members operating internationally as to whether they have a connection with a GlobalScot”.<sup>21</sup>  
<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Scottish Chambers of Commerce suggested that if “our ask of global and diaspora Scots” is that they “help us connect businesses in Scotland with market opportunities” then it was “definitely an area where we could sharpen our indicators”.<sup>21</sup> European Merchants also focused on the importance of measuring “the outcomes against whatever our objectives were in the first place” if we were “asking our diaspora...to be a vehicle for us”.<sup>21</sup>

### A Positive Experience for People Coming to live in Scotland

59. Dr Long suggested that work on the experience of migrants in Scotland could be “deepened”.<sup>23</sup>
60. The Scottish Government’s website for the NPF states—
- ” “This indicator is intended to measure one important dimension of migrants’ experiences in Scotland – a strong sense of belonging. The indicator shows the percentage of migrants who ‘very’/‘fairly’ strongly feel they belong in their neighbourhood in Scotland.”<sup>31</sup>
61. The intention was also to “investigate the potential to gather visitor experiences

data on a regular and sustainable basis” in conjunction with the Office for National Statistics and “consider adding tourists’ experience of visiting Scotland to the indicator at its next review point”.<sup>31</sup>

## Scotland's Population

62. Prosper said it was not easy with the current indicators “to track the progress that Scotland has been making” and the international ones seemed “quite diverse and in need of some focus” e.g., the indicator on population was overall population but wondered if priority should be “given to the working-age population...given the projections on the increasing dependency ratios.”<sup>21</sup> SIDA outlined what it saw as the “flaws...in the current way in which the international outcome is measured” e.g., Scotland’s population size “does not say much about Scotland’s contribution internationally”.<sup>23</sup>

## Scotland's Reputation

63. VisitScotland’s own “measurement framework” was based on four Ss: visitor spread, visitor spend, sustainability, and satisfaction. The question was “less about the number of visitors and more about the value per trip” and “equity across the country. Scottish Chambers of Commerce spoke about “the quality-versus-quantity conversation that we consistently have”.<sup>21</sup> Prosper suggested “some form of indicator would be helpful” regarding connectivity to international markets, seeking “to prioritise the most economically significant” rather than looking at all flights to all destinations.<sup>21</sup>
64. The previously mentioned Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index was described by VisitScotland as the “study that gives us an indication of Scotland’s global reputation” and measures us “against 60 other countries across a number of indicators”. Tourism and cultural heritage was highlighted as “one of our stronger indicators” recognition-wise along with the “Scotland The Perfect Stage” strategy for national events.<sup>21</sup>
65. In terms of using Scotland’s reputation as leverage in pursuit of its international objectives, and alignment of its “values, interests and policies”, European Merchants said—
- ” “We capture some of that value, but I am sure that we could capture more of it, because there is a lot of value to draw on.”<sup>21</sup>
66. Scottish Chambers of Commerce said reputation was “quite difficult to measure” but there was “some clear evidence” e.g., a recent EY attractiveness survey showing that Scotland was “the most attractive place to invest” outside of London and that 16% of “top global investors” rated Scotland as an attractive market. The challenge was “going from anecdotal evidence towards outcomes”.<sup>21</sup> In its “international trade partnership with the Scottish Government” there were “some soft measurement outcomes and some slightly harder ones”. From asking businesses that came on their trade missions about “fair work and trade principles”, it was clear that issues such as “value of opportunity and the number of jobs created” were “easily measured” but this was “about more than just hard outcomes” and there were

“bigger implications to being a good global citizen”.<sup>21</sup>

### Contribution of development support to other nations

67. SIDA highlighted research which “explains a really rigorous way of measuring the indicator” beyond the international development outcome by linking it “with climate, trade and migration”. However, there had been “six years of no metrics” on such “a really useful measure”.<sup>23</sup> Scotland’s part in the promotion of “loss and damage and vaccine equity” was measurable, it was suggested, and a global south panel “could assess whether Scotland’s voice on the global stage has been positive or negative over a period of a year”. On fossil fuels and the arms trade, “those must be measured” for transparency-sake and to enable a public discourse “about whether those things are positive or negative” but which was “difficult” without data.<sup>23</sup> Dr Long suggested that Scotland’s international development partnerships “would be useful vehicles for tracking Scotland’s international impacts, both positive and negative”.<sup>23</sup>

### Trust in public organisations

68. There is as yet no Indicator for Trust in public organisations<sup>32</sup> and no evidence was provided on this category.

### The Scottish Government’s view

69. The Cabinet Secretary agreed with previous witnesses that it was “very difficult to carry out quantitative analysis of diplomatic activity such as networking, building relationships, exercising influence and deploying soft power” and that “countries the world over” similarly struggled to do so. He said finding the data “to meet the analytical rigour” required for the NPF had been “challenging” but that there was “an opportunity...to do more to present and highlight qualitative data in a different format to demonstrate the impact of our international work”.<sup>26</sup>
70. He cited the recent *Contribution to international development: report 2021 to 2023* along with the international network’s annual report as laying the groundwork for future reporting on international strategy. Describing these as “very significant reports on the policy and how it is being conducted”<sup>26</sup>, he suggested that “a similar approach to the wide sweep of our international activity” would mean—
- ” “...we can balance strong performance on hard measures, particularly those on the economy, with a narrative about how the work of diplomats and trade and investment experts helps us to meet our objectives and to deliver impact at home.”<sup>26</sup>
71. Asked about engagement with international development organisations, the Cabinet Secretary said this was “about civil society not just in Scotland but in the countries where we operate” and it was “hugely important that this is a two-way process”—

” “...this is not just about how Scotland can help our partner nations such as Malawi, Rwanda and Zaire; it is about what we can learn from those countries, too.”<sup>26</sup>

72. Speaking about “extending development goals”, ongoing work in the areas of health and education, “supporting the role of women” via these, and the development of a Feminist Foreign Policy, he said of the latter that Scotland was “working with others to identify how can we do it”. He said that now he had “day-to-day responsibility for international development”, previously the responsibility of other colleagues, he would be in a position to “ensure” this was understood as “something that impacts on the broader work of the Scottish Government”. Citing the approach to Arctic co-operation, he spoke about “bringing together” universities to work together on “remote health, wellbeing and education” as an example as involving Scottish Government ministers in other areas. He said there were “multilateral efforts” to achieve the SDGs “for which there is responsibility across Government”.<sup>26</sup>
73. He added that the SDGs were “an external affairs area of responsibility” but he would “reflect on...how we ensure that there is wider understanding across Scottish Government”. He underlined how important it was to “capture all that in our reporting” and agreed that “they cannot be understood in only one part of Government”.<sup>26</sup>

## Recommendations

74. **There are challenges, as we found in our 2022 report, in measuring the impact of international policy through quantitative means and performance indicators. However, the Scottish Government is committed to ensure its international work is transparent, measurable or assessable, and published. A National Indicator for International Relationships (formerly International Networks) is currently being developed and we ask the Scottish Government to consult the Committee on the draft of that indicator before its ministerial sign off.**

75. **The Parliament considers the National Outcomes every five years but there is no consultation for the National Indicators. There is a concern that the Parliament is being asked to scrutinise what is being measured rather than what it is being achieved. The Committee therefore recommends that the Scottish Government 1) includes the revised National Indicators in the next and future iterations of its consultation with the Parliament on the revised National Outcomes, 2) consults with this Committee on all the revised International National Indicators for this iteration after they are drafted and before they receive ministerial sign off and 3) sets out a timeframe for publication of these Indicators.**

76. **Despite the challenges in devising metrics, we note the evidence suggesting the potential for measurability or assessment in such policy areas as conflict resolution, feminist foreign policy, and the promotion of human rights and climate justice. The Committee asks the Scottish Government to set out how it will work with colleagues in the education and the third sectors to improve understanding of the impact of its work in the international arena.**



## International offices

77. In tandem with scrutiny of the International National Outcome and Indicators, and building on our 2022 inquiry, the Committee wanted to further consider the role of the international offices in the Scottish Government's approach to external affairs, including looking at the value they add and how the impact of that work can be evaluated.
78. In December 2023, in response to a recommendations from that 2022 inquiry, the Scottish Government published “an Annual Report setting out the contribution made by the international offices to promoting the values, objectives and priorities of the revised International Framework”.<sup>12</sup>
79. That document states—
- ” “Scotland’s International Network delivers impact for the people of Scotland, by promoting Scottish goods and services in export markets, attracting inward investment, highlighting our natural advantages and deep expertise in the renewable energy transition, promoting Scottish culture and building relationships to work collaboratively on domestic policy challenges, including the twin climate and nature crises.”<sup>33</sup>

## Soft power

80. Since opening an office in Brussels in 1999, successive Scottish administrations have sought a European presence as well as pursuing a form of wider international engagement. In *Scotland’s International Strategy*, published at the start of 2024, the Scottish Government stated—
- ” “While foreign policy remains the responsibility of the UK Government, we have a proud record of engaging internationally in Scotland’s interests within current constitutional arrangements. There is a clear role for us to make a constructive contribution to addressing global challenges.”<sup>14</sup>
81. Professor Gethins suggested the question for the Scottish Government concerned the purpose of the international offices—
- ” “We invest in an office in Brussels and that is the right thing to do, but what is it fundamentally seeking to achieve? Is it to boost trade and investment? Is it for soft power? Is it to boost our educational and cultural links?”<sup>18</sup>
82. The head of the Scottish Government’s international office in Beijing detailed their “three pillar” approach to soft power, covering: climate and biodiversity; education, culture, tourism and social policy; and trade and investment. Her colleague in Copenhagen suggested “soft power is often more than soft power”, explaining how cultural events could open doors and “have a real impact”, and offering the example of an annual Nordic classical music festival which would be taking place “as a joint production” in Glasgow. The “extra dimension” in China came under its social policy pillar and entailed “sharing how the Scottish Government approaches its policy on



alleviating poverty, particularly period poverty”. Updates were shared on social media accounts last year and were said to generate “really good traction” and “a lot of debate”.<sup>29</sup>

## Global branding

83. According to the head of the Scottish Government’s Washington DC office, there was “a lot of love for...whisky and tartan and traditional versions of Scotland” but soft power enabled them to “bring people into conversations and then say, ‘But did you know this?’” That conversation might then move on to the space sector, Scotland producing more small satellites than any other country bar the United States, and more generally “where Scotland is now” in respect of trade and investment. Being based in another country meant the international offices could have a “finger on the pulse”, “be entrepreneurial” focused on “money and jobs going back into Scotland” and adapt their priorities according to local circumstances. Business plans and priorities were prepared “not just done jointly with SDI” but “across the Scottish Government” and its agencies, including “Scottish Enterprise, Creative Scotland and Screen Scotland”.<sup>29</sup>
84. In terms of tradition, European Merchants understood a “reluctance to be pigeonholed in the view of Scotland as being about St Andrew’s day, bagpipes and tartan” but made the case for using culture and history “as a catalyst, as other countries do.”<sup>21</sup>
85. The then Chair of the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee (“SAC”), speaking about its own inquiry, *Promoting Scotland Internationally*<sup>34</sup>, told us—
- ” “The kaleidoscope of cultural images that people are able to conjure up when they think of Scotland is a really powerful calling card.”<sup>35</sup>
86. He said: “we are really good at telling the story of Scotland” and that this was a feature of the UK diplomatic networks’ work in promoting all the nations in the UK. He did suggest, however, that more could be done “to promote contemporary activities, including our science, space and biotechnology sectors”, something on which his committee had encouraged the UK and Scottish Governments to work together. He encouraged “taking a journey from...the Scottish enlightenment and the great culture of invention and creativity” to the present and “our cutting-edge biotech”.<sup>35</sup>

## Evaluating the outcomes

87. The head of the Scottish Government’s office in Beijing told us that all the international offices “submit annual monitoring and evaluation returns” and “try to provide as much quantitative and qualitative evidence as possible across all areas of work”. The publication of the *International network: annual report 2022-2023* was a first but regarding diplomatic work she said that it was “not always easy to find the

quantitative evidence to back up the work that we do overseas”.<sup>29</sup>

88. Her colleague from the Copenhagen office said they could count the number of people they meet but that would say nothing of “the quality of those meetings or...whether they are actually furthering the aims of Government”. She explained that every office had “a specific mandate” and “a series of missions that the Scottish Government is running until at least the end of this session of Parliament” along with the National Indicators, adding up to “quite a lot of guidance about what we are here to achieve”. A business plan was prepared “to ensure that we are targeting high-value interlocutors and networks” but it was “very difficult” to create a national indicator in quantitative terms—

” “I hope that you will see in the annual report that we are beginning to do that at a qualitative level. I trained as a statistician and can say with some confidence that the plural of “anecdote” is not “data”. Anecdotes only start to be helpful once you have enough of them”.<sup>29</sup>

89. She said that “measurable cultural outputs”, such as a concert or Scottish musicians touring in the Nordic countries, were “really powerful” and that the staff of three covering the region gave “quite a big bang for our buck”. The UK needed Scotland to achieve its net zero targets, “all of us need that to happen on that European security level, as well as on an economic level”, and conversations with the Nordics could “end up influencing EU regulations”.<sup>29</sup>

90. The head of the Washington office said they did “a huge amount of work” to hold themselves to account but that it was “difficult to draw straight lines between diplomatic work and outcomes”. Of the US office’s six in-year objectives, some, enhancing reputation for example, were “not entirely measurable” but “most” were. A lot of the focus was economic, the annual report having highlighted investment that had come to Prestwick, something “colleagues and I have been working on for years”. SDI already doing “a lot of great work” but there were “things that we can add to” with a diplomatic mission.<sup>29</sup>

91. The then Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee told us that one of the “main asks” from their *Promoting Scotland Internationally* report was “to try to find a way of measuring the impact” to understand “the impact and effect that various interventions are having”. He also suggested that the international offices could be “unfairly characterised” by the media with “constant references to them being stuck away in a broom cupboard”, something “far from the reality of the situation”. The Washington office, for example, was “viewed very favourably by ambassadors and other key figures and officials in the embassy network”.<sup>35</sup>

92. The experience of the Irish Government was that the pursuit of missions could take time but analysis was undertaken. Its international network had expanded in recent years and the early indications were positive but there was always a need to justify the costs, including looking at the opportunity costs of not doing what was being done. The Ireland House model<sup>36</sup> meant building from the bottom up and relations between the various agencies was critical. The Northern Ireland Executive told us about its use of the global attitudes survey, working with the British Council, and how “report cards” were used to judge the impact of its international work.

## Multilevel aspects

93. Professor Kaarbo said Scotland had “its own external relations role” which was also “a constituent part of UK foreign policy”, something that it seeks to influence “especially when it affects domestic policy”. Professor Gethins suggested “UK and Scottish priorities overlap significantly” e.g., trade, climate change and the Scottish Government’s trying to exert international influence was nothing new—
- ” “Back in 1992, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Ian Lang, opened an office in Brussels with the express purpose of influencing European Union policy and wider UK policy. That approach has been pursued in the devolved era and is entirely legitimate.”<sup>17</sup>
94. Professor Jackson thought that the UK presenting itself to the world “as a diverse, modern, connected society and a place that tolerates a plurality of voices” was something positive that could promote the economic interests of Scotland while also benefitting the rest of the UK. He talked about facing up “the dark side of Scotland’s internationalist past” and specifically the benefits from and role in the “slave economies in the West Indies and the southern United States”. In developing relationships now with those countries most impacted, having conversations “squarely and honestly” there was said to be “a confluence between UK interests and Scottish interests” and both could “benefit from projecting the UK” as being “both sensitive to its past and a promoter of...good global citizen values”.<sup>17</sup>
95. Professor Kaarbo described climate change as an example of “where the action is happening in such multilateral forums”, including input from sub-states and NGOs. She cited COP26 in Glasgow as showing how smaller countries could show leadership in international negotiations. Professor Gethins said Scotland leading on loss and damage “was followed up by Wallonia”, a case of “two sub-state actors that took a lead on the issue”.He added—
- ” “I am not sure that you can be effective...tackling climate change without full engagement at sub-state level, because it is the sub-states that will need to implement many of the decisions that are made.”<sup>18</sup>
96. European Merchants said you cannot “divorce the issue of how Scotland trades with the world from the multilevel aspects” and that it was “quite important” that the UK and Scottish Governments “work productively together”.<sup>18</sup>
97. Prosper told us at “the operational level” that from their own experience and feedback from members the UK Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and the Scottish Development International (SDI) were “working well together”. Scottish Chambers of Commerce agreed that “a lot more collaboration and conversations are happening” between the two; and that the relationship between governments was important but that “it is businesses that trade, export goods and services and look for inward investment”. It was therefore “imperative that the Scottish and UK Governments engage with business” and what business needed was “simplification and stability” rather than “duplication of effort”. Cautioning against giving investors “a perception that the government are not co-operating”, the view was—

” “...ultimately, businesses want to know who they know in-country, and they will reach out, regardless of whether that is DBT or SDI...they do not mind where the help is; they simply need the help.”<sup>21</sup>

98. VisitScotland reported that its relationship with VisitBritain was “unique”, providing an “opportunity to influence the role that it plays in promoting Scotland internationally”, and to benefit from “significant resources” for marketing and “people in-market that we do not have”.<sup>21</sup>

99. The head of the Scottish Government’s international office in Copenhagen told us there was “a big set of objectives about getting the relationship right with our host British embassies” and “uniquely” in the network “we have the task of working with three, five or eight embassies” via the Nordics and Baltics networks. Despite the office being relatively new, “we are seen as part of the embassy team” and events and working groups helped ensure “we are all aware of each other’s priorities and...make ourselves relevant to each other”.<sup>29</sup>

100. Working with Scottish Government colleagues back home and UK officials on the ground, the head of the Beijing office was able to develop links with PetroChina, one of the partners of the joint venture that owns the site at Grangemouth. The hope was that such a “joined-up approach” could bring about “longer-term benefits”. The DBT had “200-odd people in Beijing...the sort of resources that we can only dream about”. There was “a really good and collaborative working relationship” with the Embassy, as well as “regular meetings and catch-ups with the deputy head of mission”.<sup>29</sup>

101. The Washington office’s head spoke of a similarly positive relationship with the Ambassador and colleagues from UKG based in the US. The work of the office had been highlighted in the SAC’s *Promoting Scotland Internationally* report. Attendance at the staff meeting “for the whole US” at the start of each week meant—

” “I can broadcast messages about what Scotland is interested in, what we are good at and what we are looking to do across the entire UK network in the US.”<sup>29</sup>

102. The then Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee agreed that “working arrangements on the ground are fantastic”. He described Washington as “an exemplar”, praising the Ambassador as somebody who “gets Scotland”, and the work of DPT lead – “a Scot who takes a real interest” in supporting Scottish businesses “across the United States”. Regarding recent political tensions between the UK and Scottish Governments, he said that this “does not reflect anything that we observed in the working arrangements throughout the diplomatic network”. He suggested that “where Scottish missions are in place in UK embassies”, they brought “extra value to Scotland” but the picture across the UK network was “mixed” and dependent on “the enthusiasm of the leadership in the embassy”. There was training for civil servants to be “brought up to speed with the range of specific and distinct Scottish issues” and the Foreign Office “always puts out a communiqué stating the expectation that those days [St Andrew’s day and Burns’ night] will be celebrated across the UK embassy network” but the “ambassador’s enthusiasm and leadership” was key. However, if there was “anything that we particularly wanted to

transmit for St Andrew's day", that "would be our job" and regarding any "outstanding tensions", he hoped we could "de-emphasise them" because—

” “Our working arrangements are sound and in a good place, and there seems to be mutual respect across all the different and distinct threads – the Scottish Government, Scottish Development International, the Department of Trade and Industry and the FCDO.”<sup>35</sup>

103. It is noted that in its 2024 manifesto, the Labour Party stated—

” “A UK Labour government will have a more collaborative approach to the Scottish Government on their international engagement. We recognise that within devolved competencies, the Scottish Government has an important role to play. In respect to wholly devolved issues, Labour will support the Scottish Government to partner with international bodies where relevant and appropriate, for example to collaborate on global health initiatives. The UK Government will retain full responsibility over foreign policy.”<sup>37</sup>

## Experience of other sub-states

104. As to “how other sub-state actors” engage internationally, Professor Gethins said there were examples to consider. He mentioned the Åland islands, with its “distinct relationship with Sweden and Finland”, the Länders in Germany, which can be party to international agreements, and both Germany and Denmark, where there are arrangements to “try to minimise disagreement” between state and sub-state. Nor was Scotland unique in its activities at the European level, with 300 or so sub-states “engaged in trying to influence the EU.”<sup>18</sup>

105. Professor Cornago said in the Austrian and German systems, there were “solutions that work really well” e.g., the German Länder had “exclusive powers” and were “entitled to be there when the international dimension is being discussed”. He highlighted “the Belgian solution” as being “a beautiful formula for internal and external matters” and “a dream for the Basque Government”. However, “in an asymmetrical system” such as Spain's, it was “more complex” and “a sort of general formula is therefore really elusive”. That meant “mutual adjustments” and “progress” or “regress” in such a system made “it almost impossible to shape a vision of the future with a smooth transformation of political institutions”. He suggested that the “diplomatic status” conferred on Scottish representatives in Brussels would be “unthinkable in Spain” but could “service to integrate and normalise the experience a little”. He saw Catalonia's situation as “temporary progress” because the “paradigm is contested” and “regress” was likely.<sup>22</sup>

106. Professor Paquin said “a major difference” with Scotland was Canada's “highly decentralised federal regime” and the “leverage” that came from the fact that the “Canadian provinces cannot be forced to implement international agreements”. This was “not perfect”, with many agreements being “ad hoc or...case-by-case” and was “why Quebec also has a permanent delegation in Ottawa” so as to lobby the federal government. He also mentioned the Council of the Federation, which was set up by the provinces “to discuss international issues that are on the table.” Regarding



immigration, he explained that “the reunification of refugees with family members” was a matter for the Canadian Government while “economic immigration” concerned “Quebec alone”. He said Quebec attracted “three times more immigrants than the United States and four times more than France”.<sup>22</sup>

107. In terms of the Basque approach to international presence, Professor Cornago said there were “around 80” delegations that worked “specifically on trade and investment” and a “quite modest” network beyond that to promote culture and language. They had “learned lessons from Quebec”, which had opened more offices in a time of economic growth but then closed half of its offices in 1995, and now took “a more pragmatic approach”, some of the offices operating not in just one nation but covering “surrounding countries in the region”. Professor Paquin said that after studying the merits of closure, the Quebec Government concluded “it was a bad idea” and all offices were reopened after three years, since when “there has been a tendency to add representation”. After the new office is opened in Tel Aviv, there will be 35, an “all-time record”. The “big *délégations générales*” are in Paris, New York, Rome and Tokyo, “full-scale representations” which cover “politics, economy, education and culture” and are staffed by “around 35 people”. Other “*délégations*” were “much smaller”, with a staff of between two and five. There were other offices, in places such as Atlanta, with just two to three people. In respect of the rationale—

” “...there is not some intense analysis by experts of where we open a location. It really depends on the political parties and the specific interests of the Government that is in place”.<sup>22</sup>

108. When it came to perceptions, Professor Paquin described “the typical image” that the French had of Quebec was of “something from the last century” while in the US “they do not even know that we exist”. A recent poll suggested 30% of US citizens believed “Canada was a US state” and, if this was correct, they were unlikely to “understand that Quebec is a province in Canada where 85% of the population speak French” and the culture and political system are different. There was “a lot of teaching to do” to promote Quebec’s image with its largest trading partner outside of Canada.<sup>22</sup>

109. From a Basque Country perspective, Professor Cornago said that Spain being a unitary state without “a proper second chamber or territorial senate”, change was shaped by “party politics and political opportunity more, perhaps, than any formal system...of intergovernmental co-operation”. The Basque Government’s first office in Brussels, “a landmark for them”, opened in 1988 and was intended as “a showcase involving all the Spanish autonomous communities”. That it proved to be “a real success” could be seen in others “copying the Basque Country over the decades in establishing the same sort of official representation”, not just in the EU “but in the Americas, too”, the example of the Basque approach having “been influential and instrumental in shaping an institutional official profile abroad”. What has been harder was engaging “dialogue about big investments” and it was thought the larger size of Madrid and Catalonia’s economies “may explain the differential disadvantage”.<sup>22</sup>

110. Another difference concerning Quebec was that it saw “itself as a social democracy in North America”, one with “state-owned enterprise in the energy sector”. Given

that it exports a lot of its energy to the US, there was a view that this too “needs to be explained to Americans” and Quebec “feels that it has to do that itself”. There was also a view that Quebecan politics, “especially when there is nationalism or a referendum”, could be “too sensitive” and “the preference has been to depoliticise trade and investment” with “a state-owned enterprise...at arm’s length from the Government”.<sup>22</sup>

111. In terms of sub-states being heard, Professor Cornago described a “sort of institutional defomalisation” in the EU, leading to “no clear vision of the place of regions in relation to that important element of policy making”. He added that “the Spanish system” made it “extremely difficult” for the Basque Country “to play an active part in the negotiations” even in those areas over which it held “exclusive powers”. Unless there was change, he suggested “the role of autonomous communities will be minimal”.<sup>22</sup> Professor Paquin told us that Quebec had been taking part in climate conferences since the early 1990s, with their senior politicians and NGOs attending, and “this seems to be working” after Al Gore labelled Quebec “a green superpower”. On artificial intelligence, Yoshua Bengio, a “leading scholar on the issue”,<sup>38</sup> was supported by Quebec’s government in setting up an institute “concerned with the ethical use of artificial intelligence in the world”—

” “That is a good case of what we call “niche diplomacy”, where you select a specific issue and then brand yourself with that issue internationally over and over again. With the passing of time, that leaves traces, and you can build influence in that way.”<sup>22</sup>

112. In Quebec, there was “a Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie...in charge of all of Quebec’s international policy” and responsible for outreach “not just to the different ministries of the Government, but to civil society”. There was “a clear effort to have domestic outreach to help people, and municipal government, internationalise their activity”. La Francophonie was an “international organisation” with “54 member states plus observers” which over the last decade “has tried to be more focused on trade and investment; prior to that, it was more invested in education and culture”.<sup>22</sup>
113. Professor Cornago said that over the previous 20 years, the Catalan approach to international outreach had been “welded with civil society”, whereas the Basque Government had more of “an emphasis on the international dimension of being an autonomous community”. The offices world-wide promoted “trade and investment” and were connected to a “network of global development aid”, also “a network with the Basque diaspora” which was “involved in the promotion of the Basque language and culture”. That was not only its focus but “sometimes civil society movements and other political parties collide with the designs that the Basque Government formulates”.<sup>22</sup>

## Engaging the diaspora

114. Professor Gethins said the Scots diaspora was estimated to be “about 40 million” and, “given the limited resources” of the Scottish Government, the engagement

would “always be reasonably light touch”.<sup>18</sup>

115. The Irish Government’s decision to build on the links with its diaspora, as the Committee learnt during its visit to Dublin in November 2023, was taken some 20 years ago, a statement of intent that it wished to invest in Irish communities around the world and promote the theme of “home”. With the Irish diaspora estimated to be in the region of 70 million, there were still gaps to plug. Some examples of which were New Zealand and Vancouver, but the Irish Government was conscious of its responsibility to Irish immigrant communities and understood that harnessing business connections with Irish links could at least help you “get a foot in the door”.

116. A “crowded market” was the concern expressed by Scottish Chambers of Commerce. With GlobalScots, export champions and international trade ambassadors, and now a network for the diaspora, this could become “quite a quagmire for businesses”. It would be “incredible” to reach “millions of people” but consideration should be given to “what the outcomes might be” and the need to “avoid duplication”—

” “...we can reach 40 million companies in the global chambers of commerce in more than 100 countries. As a result, there are already boots on the ground, so to speak, that can help us”<sup>21</sup>

117. The head of the Scottish Government’s office in Washington highlighted engagement “with diaspora and cultural organisations” which “put tens of thousands of pounds into cultural organisations in Scotland”. The National Trust for Scotland Foundation USA “runs fundraisers and engages with people throughout the US – the outreach is fantastic”, leading to funds coming to Scotland “to help with heritage projects and the built environment”. He said there were “some really good examples” but “we can do better” and one area to develop would be “the university and alumni connections”. The Edinburgh festival drew people in and we should be looking at how to “effectively monetise that” because Americans were “not shy about fundraising.”<sup>29</sup> The Irish Government had “a brilliant outreach to their diaspora”, and there is also the Ireland Funds<sup>39</sup>. He suggested that engagement with the diaspora should “talk about what Scotland does now” as well as tapping into culture and history—

” “Our brand across the world is “Scotland is now”. A lot of people in the US think that Scotland is then. They think backwards and we should be thinking forwards”.<sup>29</sup>

118. He also referred to “an affinity diaspora” of those people whose love of Scotland was based on the time they have spent here, a “slightly untapped market in the US”. It was a theme also covered by his colleague in Beijing, who pointed out that 25% of international students in Scotland were Chinese, equating to “about 20,000 students per year who then travel back to China with that positive experience of studying in Scotland and become mini ambassadors”.<sup>29</sup>

119. The then Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee told us that tartan week had “the best-designed and best put together organisations” out of the Scottish diaspora. However, organising those celebrations presented “a real challenge” and they were “not sufficiently resourced to do some of their work”. The Scottish Government had



“generously given a number of grant supports over the years” but there was “a sense that they seem to be doing it all on their own”. More information and support was needed so that “they might amplify the work that is happening in Scotland and promote our many attributes”. It was a “traditional image of Scotland that they present”, as do “a lot of the Caledonian societies”, but—

” “...they are asking how much they could do to promote some of the more modern images of Scotland.”<sup>35</sup>

120. His own committee’s inquiry had been “keen to harvest the usefulness of all the traditional images” of Scotland as “a gateway to presenting a more contemporary image of Scotland”. Describing the diaspora as “a much underutilised resource”, he recalled “the early says of tartan week in the early 2000s” and “queues of people” at VisitScotland’s stall at Grand Central to “see where their Scottish heritage fitted in”. He wondered if there was more we could do to support the diaspora, these groups and societies being “amplifiers for our country”.<sup>35</sup>

## The Scottish Government’s view

121. The Cabinet Secretary emphasised the cross-party nature of Scotland’s own international presence—

” “Scotland House in Brussels was established under the Conservatives, while other parts of the network were established during the first sessions of the Scottish Parliament and, since 2007, have been built on by the current administration”.<sup>26</sup>

122. He told us the international network makes “a significant contribution” in support of businesses and “Scottish interests” and referred to the latest EY investment attractiveness survey, showing that “for the eighth consecutive year Scotland has, outside London, been the most attractive destination for foreign investment in the UK”.<sup>26</sup>

123. Following publication of the *International network: annual report 2022-2023* at the end of 2023, the Scottish Government was “now undertaking monitoring and evaluation” for the second such report, “which we will publish later this year”. The Cabinet Secretary said that he wanted “to continue refining and improving reports” and ensuring “accountability and transparency in how Scotland’s international network delivers.”<sup>26</sup>

124. He said that “Ireland has been pursuing a focused diaspora policy” for decades and that it was “a policy priority not just for its Department of Foreign Affairs but for other departments” with the aim “to improve Ireland’s exports and inward investment”. The Irish approach had been a “significant influence” he said on *The Scottish Connections Framework*—

” “We have learned that taking diaspora seriously is a good thing to do, and we are doing it.”<sup>26</sup>

125. Seeking to encourage a “much wider understanding of what a diaspora is”, he said it could cover not just those who “historically” came from Scotland” but also “people whose connection to Scotland might be very current” whether through study (e.g., “thousands of students in China are now part of Scotland’s wider diaspora, too”), living here, or simply visiting. One “relatively new area” was “a significant number of African-Americans” who have Scottish heritage. He also spoke about “two resources that did not exist before” available via “Scotland’s digital shopfront at [www.scotland.org](http://www.scotland.org)”, one to “register to be part of Scottish diaspora organisations around the world”, the other “if one lives outside Scotland” but wanted to individually “sign up”.<sup>26</sup>

## Recommendations

126. **The Committee welcomes the publication at the end of last year of *the International network: annual report 2022-2023*, the first such report to set out the contribution made by the international offices to promoting the values, objectives and priorities of *Scotland’s International Strategy*, and a key recommendation from our 2022 inquiry. We note that monitoring and evaluation is underway for the second such report and welcome the Cabinet Secretary’s assurances that the approach will be to continue to refine and improve these reports to ensure accountability and transparency in how the network is delivering against its objectives.**

127. **Given the passage of time, as well as the outcome of the recent UK General Election, we ask the Scottish Government to provide an update on the status of the 2013 *Concordat on International Relations* with the UK Government and how it now fits with the relatively new Intergovernmental Review structure and arrangements. The Committee supports a more collaborative approach between the Scottish Government and the UK Government on international engagement and we will ask the UK Government to provide an update on progress in delivering this approach.**

128. **We ask the Scottish Government to reflect on the evidence in this inquiry and, in its response to this report, provide some examples of where it has been able to learn lessons from other small countries or sub-states and their approach to international work, or vice versa, particularly concerning the evaluation of that work.**

129. **The Committee notes the commitment to review *The Scottish Connections Framework* every two years; and we ask the Scottish Government to set out in its response to this report, as well as to inform the next iteration of that Framework, what its future engagement with the diaspora – in all its varied forms – will look like in terms of the extent to which it will be supported,**

**what is hoped to be achieved in economic and cultural terms, and how it will be evaluated. Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the Scottish Government undertakes to publish a report every two years based on its review of the Framework and setting out the contribution made by its work with the diaspora in terms of promoting the values, objectives and priorities of *Scotland's International Strategy*.**

# Conclusions

130. **As stated in the report from our 2022 inquiry, the Committee believes that the international work of the Scottish Government should be strategic in approach, explicit about its priorities, and informed by a clear set of policies, values and objectives. There should also be an emphasis on effective collaboration across government in relation to external affairs and how this interacts with domestic priorities, and – allied to that policy coherence – continuing work to address challenges in measuring the impact of soft power and enhancing scrutiny.**

131. **Scotland is far from unique in being a sub-state or small country engaged in international work. This inquiry has enabled us to learn about the approach and experience of others, in particular the Basque Country and Quebec, as well as Ireland.**

132. **We have also heard that soft power is about persuasion, narrative, credibility, culture as a catalyst, the balancing of values and interests, and good global citizenship. The Scottish Council on Global Affairs suggested it was not only governments that engage internationally, highlighting the work of Beyond Borders Scotland, the NGO whose founder has argued for the potential of Scotland's global influence, citing the importance of a strong brand and identity, our cultural resources, and the story we tell.**

# Annexe A

## The Committee's previous work

The Committee's 2022 report on the Scottish Government's international work concluded that while a focus on Europe could be expected to be a priority, wider external engagement (for reasons of trade, culture, education etc.) would also be necessary; as would a strategic approach, one with a clear geographical and thematic rationale.<sup>12</sup> The key themes from the previous inquiry were—

- that importance of adopting a strategic approach
- the need for a prioritisation of policies to flow from that approach
- an emphasis on effective collaboration across government to encourage policy coherence in relation both to external affairs and how this interacts with domestic priorities
- challenges in measuring impact and
- how we enhance scrutiny<sup>12</sup>

The Committee stated that the revised International Framework being developed at the time should link to and flow from the NPF, be at the heart of the Scotland Government's approach to external affairs, and provide a foundation for all other relevant frameworks, strategies and policy documents in that sphere. Such an approach was considered necessary for a clearer understanding of the Scottish Government's priorities. Otherwise, for the Committee, and anyone else interested in this policy area, it would be difficult to find answers to fundamental questions such as what we are doing, why we are doing it, how well we are doing it etc.<sup>12</sup>

The Committee's recommendations were that the approach to international policy should—

- set out its values and objectives (linked to the domestic agenda)
- stipulate a long-term timeframe (e.g., for the remainder of the 2020s)
- prioritise countries, regions and policy themes
- provide a clear rationale for that prioritisation
- link to relevant aspects of economic, cultural and education policy
- integrate international offices into its strategy
- explore how to better inform the public and media on the importance of Scotland's European and external relations<sup>12</sup>

# The Scottish Government's response and other documents

Since publication of the Committee's report in 2022 there has been a slew of relevant Scottish Government publications, as outlined below.

## Response to the Committee's report

In his letter of response to the 2022 report, the Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture (the Cabinet Secretary) wrote that the success of domestic policies were "invariably impacted by wider regional and international factors" and it was "crucial that Scotland remains active and effective in how it carries out its international activity". He stated that—

“...in line with the committee's recommendations, the Global Affairs Framework recognises the interlinkages between our domestic and international work and is rooted in the National Performance Framework.”<sup>13</sup>

The Scottish Government's international work "will contribute to meeting the objectives outlined in the National Performance Framework...and sharing Scotland's experience in policy-making, while learning ourselves from others". He also stated that "I strongly agree with the Committee's recommendation that, in addition to a focus on maintaining the best possible relations with Europe, the Scottish Government should adopt a holistic approach to external engagement including in key thematic areas such as trade, culture and education" and that the Global Affairs Framework would outline such a focus.<sup>13</sup>

## The Global Affairs Framework

The Scottish Government published its Global Affairs Framework in May 2022, setting out "the values and principles underpinning the Scottish Government's international work and the basis on which the Scottish Government will prioritise its international activity". The aim was to support domestic agenda including the "creation of good, green jobs, reducing child poverty, gender and other inequalities at home and overseas" and to contribute to the achievement of both the domestic National Outcomes and the NPF as well as the SDGs.

40

The seven cores areas of focus, or "values and principles", as had been highlighted in the Scottish Government's response to the Committee's 2022 report were—

- Good global citizenship
- Maintaining the closest possible relationship with the EU
- Gender equality
- The climate crisis and climate justice
- Respect for human rights and the rule of law
- The role of our international network

- Scotland's culture<sup>40</sup>

Whilst the new framework set out a number of ambitions, it did not include targets or indicate how success was to be evaluated; nor did it detail how the new framework would relate to the Scottish Government's five country engagement strategies (covering the United States, China, Canada, India and Pakistan). The lack of targets within the framework and absence of a clear link with the country engagement strategies suggested that assessment and therefore scrutiny could be challenging, an issue highlighted by the Committee in its 2022 report.<sup>41</sup>

However, the framework did seek to address three of the key themes which the Committee had focused on in that report: the importance of adopting a strategic approach; the need for a prioritisation of policies to flow from that approach; and an emphasis on effective collaboration across government to encourage policy coherence in relation both to external affairs and how this interacts with domestic priorities.<sup>41</sup>

## The Scottish Connections Framework

In April 2023, the Scottish Government published the Scottish Connections Framework, which set out its approach to engaging with Scotland's diaspora. The Framework included a number of commitments on how it will seek to engage with the diaspora but was less clear on measurable benefits. There was a commitment to review the document every two years but no articulation of what deeper engagement with the diaspora hoped to achieve in economic and cultural terms.<sup>42</sup>

## Taking a feminist approach to international relations: position paper

The Scottish Government published a position paper in November 2023 stating that gender equality was "at the heart of the Scottish Government's vision for a fairer world" and that it wanted "women and girls to be empowered to exercise equal rights and opportunities...and live their lives free from all forms of violence, abuse and harassment". It stated that a "feminist approach to international relations will support the delivery of domestic policy objectives as we continue to project the values we espouse on the global stage".<sup>43</sup>

There was a commitment to monitoring and evaluation and to ensure that the outcomes were "mapped onto the NPF National Outcomes".<sup>[1]</sup> As it developed this feminist approach to international relations, the Scottish Government would "seek to identify specific commitments and be realistic about how long it takes to achieve cultural, social, economic and other types of change". It also undertook to "publish a detailed monitoring and evaluation framework...once the multi-criteria analysis of the thematic recommendations has been concluded".<sup>43</sup>

## International network: annual report 2022-2023

In December 2023, in response to one of the Committee's other recommendations in our earlier report, the Scottish Government published "an Annual Report setting out the contribution made by the international offices to promoting the values, objectives and priorities of the revised International Framework".<sup>12</sup>

The report detailed Scotland's international network as comprising:

- two Scotland House offices, in Brussels and London
- seven Scottish Government international offices in North America, Europe and Asia
- over thirty Scottish Development International (SDI) offices across the world<sup>33</sup>

It included "relevant case studies and highlights from the monitoring and evaluation process under the previous framework" (which had been superseded by *Scotland's International Strategy*), including: various promotional events based around the "cultural calendar" – i.e., Burns Night, St Andrew's Day and Tartan Day – in North America, China, France, Germany and the Nordics; investment from the US with the expectation of 575 new real living wage jobs at the Prestwick International Aerospace Park; increased exports to Quebec for Scottish distilleries, with forecast sales of over £9 million and an estimated 150 jobs "created or safeguarded"; and KultraLab, a behavioural science and technology company, establishing Edinburgh hub that could result in "up to 25 high-value jobs in Scotland".<sup>33</sup>

In highlighting the work of the international offices via case studies and "some of their successes in 2022-23", the first Annual report was described as "a starting point to build from for future reporting on how the network is delivering against the three strategic priorities identified for the international network".<sup>33</sup>

## Scotland's International Strategy

Published in January 2024, *Scotland's International Strategy* sought to build on the earlier *Global Affairs Framework*, referencing the impact of "global challenges and events" and the "need to remain engaged internationally". Linking international engagement with domestic policy, the ministerial foreword stated—

“We cannot truly and effectively deliver our domestic priorities and these missions without acknowledging and playing our part in addressing the range of global challenges that contribute to them, as well as contributing internationally in return in a spirit of global solidarity”.<sup>14</sup>

The Strategy espoused a "Team Scotland" approach, partnering with its agencies and others in the enterprise, creative, tourist and education sectors, as well as the diaspora, in order to "deliver tangible benefits to the people of Scotland". Forthcoming international education and international culture strategies were also trailed (see Annexe A). The importance of Scotland "being a good global citizen" was underscored and clarity of "values, priorities and actions" could "ensure that our international work makes a



substantial, positive impact not only on the lives of people in Scotland, but also those on whom our international development engagement is focused".<sup>14</sup>

Three key policy areas were outlined—

- economy, trade and investment
- climate change, biodiversity and renewable energy and
- reputation, influence and relationships<sup>14</sup>

The Strategy also set out case studies and references to evidence-based decision making and shared policy learning but was otherwise light on the question of monitoring and evaluation. There was though a commitment to “provide updates on our progress on a regular basis”, including annually via the to set out “a high-level assessment of the key themes and priorities...and how we have delivered on these”.<sup>14</sup>

## Scotland's International Education Strategy

Published in February 2024, the first International Education Strategy for Scotland was developed alongside Universities Scotland and Colleges Scotland to provide “a vision and set of actions for continued promotion of our universities and colleges globally” that was in alignment with commitments to the Scottish Government’s NPF and UN SDGs.<sup>44</sup>

The Strategy highlighted that colleges were well placed to “act as ‘enablers’ of internationalisation given their responsibility to reflect the needs of industry, government, and internationally competitive skills” and suggested that the “opportunity to draw in talent, co-develop and attract investment into joint collaborations, and build our international reputation and profile is huge”.<sup>44</sup>

Ambitions, actions and baseline indicators were set out under three headings—

- Destination Scotland - inward attraction of international students, staff, and researchers
- International Education and Economic Growth - maximising exports
- Research and Knowledge Exchange - Scotland’s world leading offer .<sup>44</sup>

## Inspiring Connections: Scotland's International Culture Strategy

Scotland’s International Culture Strategy was published in March 2024 and intended to apply up until 2030 “with periodic review”. Delivery was described as “an iterative process” that would engage those in the sector “as well as the wider Scottish public sector”. The Strategy stated—

” “There is no doubt that culture in a wide sense is central to positive perceptions of Scotland internationally and to our attractiveness as a destination and partner. In 2022, Scotland was ranked 15th out of 60 countries in the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index in terms of survey respondents’ perceptions of Scotland’s culture.”<sup>45</sup>

Development of a “theory of change model” would “document the evidentiary indicators that will be used to measure and demonstrate change” and an “accompanying monitoring and evaluation plan” would “support progress towards the strategy’s vision and provide accountability”.<sup>45</sup>

## **Contribution to international development: report 2021 to 2023**

Published in June 2024, the Contribution to international development report took a “holistic look” at the Scottish Government’s international development work “within the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals”. It drew on the key outcomes of the International Development Principles, published in March 2021 and “co-designed with representatives of government, academics and civil society in our partner countries and in Scotland”.<sup>46</sup>

The report outlined “individual projects’ monitoring, evaluation and review activities”, highlighted progress from 2021/2022 to 2023/24, and included case studies and “lessons learned in equalities, education, health, renewable energy, and global citizenship”.<sup>46</sup>

In the ministerial foreword, the Cabinet Secretary reiterated a commitment to “increase our International Development Fund to reach £15 million per annum by the end of this Parliament” and highlighted that “our separate Climate Justice Fund was trebled to provide £36 million across this Parliament”. He stated—

” “We have a duty both to taxpayers here in Scotland and to communities in the Global South to ensure our investment is targeted for maximum impact.”<sup>46</sup>

## **Annexe B: Membership changes**

Since the Committee began to take evidence on the inquiry, the membership of the Committee has changed as follows—

- On 29 June 2023, Kate Forbes MSP replaced Ben Macpherson MSP;
- On 29 June 2023, Keith Brown MSP replaced Alasdair Allan MSP;
- On 29 June 2023, Alexander Stewart MSP replaced Maurice Golden MSP;
- On 9 February 2024, former MSP Donald Cameron resigned from the Committee;
- On 14 March 2024, Alexander Stewart MSP was appointed as Deputy Convener;
- On 21 March 2024, Meghan Gallacher MSP was appointed to the Committee;

- On 10 May 2024, Kate Forbes MSP resigned from the Committee;
- On 18 June 2024, George Adam MSP was appointed to the Committee;
- On 26 June 2024, Patrick Harvie MSP replaced Mark Ruskell MSP;
- On 10 October 2024, Stephen Kerr MSP replaced Meghan Gallacher MSP.

The Committee considered and agreed this report at its meeting on 26 September 2024.

- [1] The Scottish Council on Global Affairs. (2023, April 22). Mission Statement. Retrieved from <https://scga.scot/2022/04/14/mission-statement/>
- [2] SPICe. (2024, May 2). Evolving Goals: Insights into the National Performance Framework Review . Retrieved from <https://spice-spotlight.scot/2024/05/02/evolving-goals-insights-into-the-national-performance-framework-review/>
- [3] Scottish Government. (2024, May 1). Consultation with Parliament in connection with the Review of National Outcomes. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/information-hub/consultation-parliament-connection-review-national-outcomes>
- [4] Scottish Government. (2024, August 7). Explore the National Outcomes. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [5] Scottish Parliament. (2024, May 24). Evolving Goals: Insights into the National Performance Framework Review. Retrieved from <https://spice-spotlight.scot/2024/05/02/evolving-goals-insights-into-the-national-performance-framework-review/> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [6] Scottish Government. (2024). Our Place - National Performance Framework. Retrieved from <https://www.ourplace.scot/about-place/national-performance-framework> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [7] Scottish Government. (2024). Scottish Government: National Performance Framework. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/national-outcomes/international> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [8] Scottish Government. (2024). National Performance Framework: About the International National Outcome. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/explore-national-outcomes/international/about-national-outcome> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [9] Scottish Government. (2024). NPF: About the National Indicators . [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [10] Scottish Government. (2024). NPF: International Exporting. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/national-outcomes/economy/about-national-indicators/international-exporting> [accessed 7 October 2024]
- [11] Children's Parliament. (2023, April). What kind of Scotland? Reviewing the National Outcomes for Scotland through the lens of Children's Parliament's programme of work from 2018 to 2023. Retrieved from [https://www.childrensparliament.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-Kind-of-Scotland-2023\\_Reviewing-the-National-Outcomes-for-Scotland-Childrens-Parliament-April-2023-1.pdf](https://www.childrensparliament.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-Kind-of-Scotland-2023_Reviewing-the-National-Outcomes-for-Scotland-Childrens-Parliament-April-2023-1.pdf) [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [12] Scottish Parliament. (2022). Inquiry into the Scottish Government's international work. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/business-items/inquiry-into-the-scottish-governments-international-work> [accessed 8 October 2024]

- [13] Scottish Government. (2022, June 6). Scottish Government's response to the Committee's inquiry report . Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/-/media/files/committees/constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/correspondence/2022/06062022-sg-reponse-to-the-ceeac-report-on-sgs-international-work.pdf>
- [14] Scottish Government. (2024, January 24). Scotland's International Strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-international-strategy/documents/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [15] British Council. (2020, February). Gauging International Perceptions: Scotland and Soft Power. Retrieved from <https://scotland.britishcouncil.org/programmes/society/gauging-international-perceptions> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [16] Scottish Council on Global Affairs. (2023, June). SCOGA written submission. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/~media/committ/6032/Paper-1--1-June> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [17] Scottish Parliament. (2023, June 1). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/official-report/search-what-was-said-in-parliament/CEEAC-01-06-2023?meeting=15348> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [18] Scottish Parliament. (2023, June 1). Official Report . Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/official-report/search-what-was-said-in-parliament/CEEAC-01-06-2023?meeting=15348> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [19] Beyond Borders Scotland. (2024). BBS: Who We Are. Retrieved from <https://www.beyondbordersscotland.com/who-we-are/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [20] Beyond Borders Scotland. (2017, November 24). Using Culture and Scotland's Soft Power to Help to Resolve Conflict in the 21st Century. Retrieved from <https://www.beyondbordersscotland.com/using-culture-and-scotlandaes-soft-power-to-help-to-resolve-conflict-in-the-21st-century/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [21] Scottish Parliament. (2023, June 15). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/official-report/search-what-was-said-in-parliament/CEEAC-15-06-2023?meeting=15377> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [22] Scottish Parliament. (2023, November 9). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/meetings/2023/ceeacs62330> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [23] Scottish Parliament. (2024, May 16). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/meetings/2024/constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee-16-may-2024> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [24] Brand Scotland. (2024). Brand Scotland: About Us. Retrieved from <https://www.scotland.org/more-info/about-us> [accessed 8 October 2024]

- [25] Scottish Government. (2024, May 1). Consultation with Parliament in connection with the Review of National Outcomes. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/information-hub/consultation-parliament-connection-review-national-outcomes#Purpose> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [26] Scottish Parliament. (2024, June 20). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/official-report/search-what-was-said-in-parliament/CEEAC-20-06-2024?meeting=15949> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [27] Scottish Government. (2024). Nation Brands Index. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/collections/nation-brands-index/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [28] Scotland's International Development Alliance. (2023). Is Scotland Spilling Over? Measuring Scotland's Global Impact in the National Performance Framework . Retrieved from [https://intdevalliance.scot/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/BRIEFING\\_Measuring\\_Scotlands\\_Global\\_Impact\\_NPF.pdf](https://intdevalliance.scot/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/BRIEFING_Measuring_Scotlands_Global_Impact_NPF.pdf) [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [29] Scottish Parliament. (2023, December 14). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/committees/current-and-previous-committees/session-6-constitution-europe-external-affairs-and-culture-committee/meetings/2023/ceeacs62335> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [30] GlobalScot. (2024). GlobalScot: About The Network. Retrieved from <https://www.globalscot.com/about-network> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [31] Scottish Government. (2024). National Outcomes: About the National Indicators: A positive experience for people coming to live in Scotland. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/national-outcomes/international/about-international-national-indicators/positive-experience-people-coming-live-scotland#:~:text=This%20indicator%20is%20intended%20to,in%20their%20neighbourhood%20in%20Scotland> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [32] Scottish Government. (2024). About International National Indicators: Trust in Public Organisations. Retrieved from <https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/national-outcomes/explore-national-outcomes/international/about-international-national-indicators/trust-public-organisations> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [33] Scottish Government. (2023, December 11). International network: annual report 2022-2023. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-international-network-annual-report-2022-23/pages/8/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [34] House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee. (2023, September 4). Promoting Scotland Internationally Eighth Report of Session 2022–23. Retrieved from <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41352/documents/203208/default/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [35] Scottish Parliament. (2024, February 1). Official Report. Retrieved from <https://www.parliament.scot/chamber-and-committees/official-report/search-what-was-said-in-parliament/CEEAC-01-02-2024?meeting=15690> [accessed 8 October 2024]

- [36] Government of Ireland. (2019, July 8). Ireland to double its impact in Asia as part of next phase of Global Ireland 2025. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/4bd116-ireland-to-double-its-impact-in-asia-as-part-of-next-phase-of-global/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [37] The Labour Party. (2024). Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024. Retrieved from <https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-Party-manifesto-2024.pdf> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [38] Montreal AI Ethics Institute. (2024). About. Retrieved from <https://montrealetics.ai/about/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [39] The Ireland Funds. (2024). The Ireland Funds: About Us. Retrieved from <https://irelandfunds.org/about-us/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [40] Scottish Government. (2022, May 9). Scotland's Global Affairs Framework. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-global-affairs-framework/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [41] Scottish Parliament. (2022, May 9). SPICe Spotlight: The Scottish Government's new approach to its international work. Retrieved from <https://spice-spotlight.scot/2022/05/09/the-scottish-governments-new-approach-to-its-international-work/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [42] Scottish Government. (2023, April 11). Scottish Connections Framework. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-connections-framework/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [43] Scottish Government. (2023, November). Taking a feminist approach to international relations: position paper. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/taking-feminist-approach-international-relations/pages/3/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [44] Scottish Government. (2024, February 7). Scotland's international education strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-international-education-strategy/pages/1/> [accessed 8 October 2024]
- [45] Scottish Government. (2024, March 28). Inspiring Connections: Scotland's International Culture Strategy. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/inspiring-connections-scotlands-international-culture-strategy/pages/7/>
- [46] Scottish Government. (2024, June 17). Contribution to international development: report 2021 to 2023. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.scot/publications/contribution-international-development-report-20212023/> [accessed 8 October 2024]



